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PATENT TERM ADJUSTMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States patent system represents a measured trade-off
between two competing policy considerations: providing sufficient
incentives to encourage the innovation and development of new and
socially useful inventions; and ensuring that such inventions are readily
available to the public at an affordable price.' From 1861 to 1995, this
trade-off was achieved by granting the owner of a patent a seventeen-year
term of exclusivity to market the patented product.2 Congress deemed this
period to be sufficiently long for inventors to recoup their research and
development costs and to earn a profit, while not depriving the public of
affordable versions of inventions for an inordinate duration. In 1995, the
patent term was modified to twenty years from the earliest date of patent
filing in accordance with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) to
achieve uniformity among patent terms internationally.4
Although the default patent term is now twenty years from filing,
various features of, and changes to, the patent system over the years have
allowed patent owners potentially to extend the duration of their patent
monopolies, sometimes for several years. Such extensions, although
seemingly insignificant when compared to the full patent term, have an
enormous impact on patent holders, their competitors, and the public. In
1 See T. Randolph Beard et al., Quantifying the Cost of Substandard Patents: Some
Preliminary Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 240, 241 (2010).
2 The first patent statute was passed in 1790. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. It
was the Patent Act of 1861, however, that established a patent term of seventeen years.
Pub. L. No. 36-42, § 16, 12 Stat. 246, 249 (1861). This remained unchanged until the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1995.
This assumption has been criticized. E.g., Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent
Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 283 (2006).
4 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). See also Adam Isaac Hasson, Domestic Implementation
of International Obligations: The Quest for World Patent Law Harmonization, 25 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 373, 378 (2002).
For example, Pfizer's profits declined 19% in the first quarter of 2012, a loss
attributed by the company largely to the expiration of the company's patent on the
blockbuster drug Lipitor. Katie Thomas, Pfizer Profit Declines 19% on Slumping Lipitor
Sales, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, at Bl. Conversely, a report by the Government
Accountability Office estimates that the use of generic drugs rather than brand name
counterparts has saved the U.S. health care system over one trillion dollars in 11 years.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 12-371R, DRUG PRICING: RESEARCH ON
SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 10 (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/
588064.pdf.
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some cases, an extension merely corrects a deficiency in the patent
balancing system and ensures equilibrium between incentives and access.
In other cases, however, an extension may result in a socially harmful
enlargement of the patent holder's monopoly, allowing the patentee to
collect a windfall beyond what was necessary to incent the invention's
development, while stifling competition and depriving the public of
affordable access to the invention.7  In all cases-whether justified
according to the patent balancing formula-these extensions delay
competition and access while introducing uncertainty about the expiration
of the patent. It is thus beneficial to distinguish situations where
extensions are justified to provide adequate research and development
incentives from situations where extensions are not justified.
Unfortunately, a systematic parsing of socially valuable and socially
harmful extensions has not been undertaken because the various
opportunities for a patent term extension have arisen in a piecemeal
fashion. Due to the evolution of the patent system, a patent may be
eligible for several extensions concurrently. Rather than conducting a
holistic analysis, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
and the Federal Circuit have addressed each potential extension situation
as it has arisen. Underlying each evaluation, analyses have variously relied
on policy considerations, statutory interpretation, administrative deference,
or a combination of these factors. This has led to a complex set of rules
governing patent extensions that has been criticized as having arisen ad
hoc, without a systematic evaluation of potential policy implications.9
This Article clarifies the current law governing the various forms of
patent extensions and their interactions, and evaluates this law from a
policy perspective. Part II explains the various situations where a patentee
may extend the patent term and the current state of the law applicable to
each of these situations. Part III examines the advent of each of these
rules, including any relevant Federal Circuit decisions, and asks whether
6 The Hatch-Waxman extension arguably achieves this goal in the pharmaceutical
industry, where regulatory review periods often significantly truncate patent terms in an
industry where research and development costs are high. See, e.g., Colleen Kelly, The
Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch- Waxman Act, the 2003
Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FooD & DRUG L.J. 417,418 (2011).
7 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 247, 248 (1994).
8 See, e.g., Emily M. Hinkens, Patent Term Adjustment and Terminal Disclaimers: Are




the rules and any justifications for these rules are consistent with a proper
balancing of incentives to innovate with competition and public access.
This Article concludes that although the Federal Circuit's reasoning in
cases involving patent extensions can indeed be characterized as ad hoc,
the court's holdings in these cases mostly promote the goals of the patent
system. Further, for those situations not yet litigated before the Federal
Circuit, the USPTO has been relatively successful in instituting practices
that promote the goals of the patent system, with a few notable exceptions.
Part IV concludes by suggesting some modifications to the current law that
will better align the rules for patent expiration adjustments with the goals
of the patent system. The part also suggests that, when appropriate, the
Federal Circuit should give due deference to current USPTO regulations
and practice.
II. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADJUSTING THE PATENT TERM
A. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act
The most straightforward opportunity to extend the duration of a patent
was made available to patent holders subsequent to the passing of the
URAA in 1994.10 The URAA made changes to U.S. patent law
contemplated in the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Convention (TRIPs) signed by the United States and other World Trade
Organization members." Many provisions of TRIPs were drafted with the
goal of harmonizing diverse international patent law regimes.' 2  In
particular, to advance this goal, the URAA changed the duration of the
patent term in the United States from seventeen years from the date of
patent issue (where it had remained consistently since 1861) to twenty
years from the date of earliest filing of a patent application. 13 Under the
URAA, any patent application filed after June 8, 1995, is given a default
term of twenty years calculated from the earliest date of filing.' 4
To facilitate the transition from the previous patent term to the new
patent term implemented under the URAA, U.S. patent law allows any
patentee with a patent application filed or granted prior to June 8, 1995,
and still in effect on that date to "extend" the term of the patent to the
10 Hasson, supra note 4, at 377-78.
" Id. at 376.
12 d
1 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006); Hasson, supra note 4, at 378.
14 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
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longer of twenty years from filing or seventeen years from issuance."
This automatic "extension" allows a patentee with a patent application
filed prior to 1995, and previously bound to a seventeen-year term, to add
up to three years to the patent term.16  Conversely, a patentee with an
application filed but not granted prior to 1995 that would suffer under the
URAA because of a more than three-year interval between filing and
issuance would have its patent term effectively extended by claiming a full
seventeen years from patent issuance.17 The term adjustment under these
provisions is granted automatically; a patentee who meets the requirements
outlined in 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) need not petition the USPTO nor comply
with other formalities to obtain the benefit of the longer patent term.
1. Terminally Disclaimed Patents and the URAA
a. Generally
Terminally disclaimed patents complicate the URAA scheme of
adjustments. A terminally disclaimed patent is a patent with a term that
has been shortened at the election of the patentee.' 9 The patentee truncates
the patent's term to comply with the patentability requirements of the
" Id. § 154(c)(1). Note that the twenty-year term will not always result in the longer
patent term because it is calculated from the date of filing, whereas the seventeen-year term
is calculated from the date of patent issuance. Thus, if more than three years had elapsed
between the time of filing and the patent's issuance, the seventeen-year term would grant
the patentee a longer patent term.
16 The three year maximum extension assumes the interval between filing and issuance
could be as low as zero. In reality, patent prosecution usually takes significantly longer
than this. The USPTO's Performance and Accountability Report for 2012 reported that the
average total pendency of a patent application for that year was 32.4 months. U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2012,
at 14, http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2012PAR.pdf.
17 The degree of this effective "extension" would vary based on the actual interval
between filing and issuance. For example, if four years elapsed between filing the patent
application and patent issuance, then the patent term would effectively be extended by one
year under this provision. The patent term under the UAAA would only be sixteen years
(twenty years from filing less the four-year delay), but the patentee could claim a full
seventeen-year term. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1).
18 Section 154(c)(1) states simply that the patent term of such a patent "shall be the
greater of' the twenty-year term or seventeen years from grant. Id.
19 See id. § 253; Hinkens, supra note 8, at 389.
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20Patent Act. In particular, a terminally disclaimed patent is one that the
USPTO would otherwise reject because the underlying invention is
obvious in light of a patent previously issued to or submitted by the
patentee.2 1 The second patent would thus violate the well-established
prohibition on "double patenting." 2 2  A patentee can overcome this
obstacle by disclaiming the term of the second, obvious patent that extends
beyond the term of the reference patent.23 The second patent is thus tied to
the reference patent and expires on the same date as the reference patent.24
This practice is socially beneficial because it prevents the patentee from
reaping an unwarranted time extension to the monopoly granted by the
reference patent.25  The terminal disclaimer is also beneficial to the
patentee because it allows the second, disclaimed patent to issue with a
term of exclusivity, albeit truncated, for the additional innovations claimed
in the disclaimed patent. Additionally, a terminal disclaimer protects the
patentee from having the second, disclaimed patent rejected in a
reexamination proceeding or in litigation on obviousness grounds.26
b. Interaction of the Terminal Disclaimer with a URAA
Adjustment
What is the effect of the URAA on a terminally disclaimed patent filed
or granted prior to June 8, 1995? As explained, the changes to U.S. patent
law due to implementing the URAA provide that a patent filed at the
2o See Hinkens, supra note 8, at 389-90. The patentability requirements are found in
35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 102, 103,112 (West 2013 & Supp.).
21 Hinkens, supra note 8, at 390.
22 There are two types of double patenting. The first is grounded in statutory language
providing that an inventor may obtain "a patent" on an invention, 35 U.S.C. § 101
(emphasis added), and prohibits an inventor from obtaining more than one patent on a
single invention. The second type, which is of concern here, is termed "non-statutory" or
"obviousness-type" double patenting, and is a "judicially created doctrine grounded in
public policy that 'prevents the extension of the term of a patent ... by prohibiting the
issuance of the claims in a second patent not patentably distinct from the claims of the first
patent."' Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(quoting In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
23 See 35 U.S.C. § 253; Hinkens, supra note 8, at 390.
24 See Hinkens, supra note 8, at 390. This general outcome has various exceptions that
this Article explores.
25 In re Van Omum, 686 F.2d 937, 943-44 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting In re Schneller,
397 F.2d 350, 354 (C.C.P.A. 1968)).
26 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(c) (2012).
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appropriate time automatically garners the benefit of a term equal to the
greater of seventeen years from grant or twenty years from filing.27 For
example, a reference patent to which a second patent is terminally
disclaimed will have its term automatically adjusted under this provision.28
However, the second, terminally disclaimed patent will only benefit from
the adjustment to the term of the reference patent under certain
circumstances. 2 9  According to USPTO regulations, if the terminal
disclaimer expressly disclaims the terminal portion of its term by
referencing the "full statutory term" of the reference patent and does not
mention a specific date, then the term of the terminally disclaimed patent is
automatically adjusted to terminate concurrently with the first patent.30 If
the terminally disclaimed patent does not reference the first patent,
however, but merely states a date after which the terminally disclaimed
patent will expire, it may not claim the benefit of the URAA adjustment
granted to the first patent and expires on the listed date.
B. Patent Term Adjustments Due to USPTO Delay
Section 154(b) provides a second means by which the initial term of a
patent may be extended. Following the changes the URAA made to U.S.
patent law, patentees raised the concern that a patent term would
effectively be reduced relative to the previous seventeen-year term when
application processing delays cause the patent to issue more than three
years after the application's filing.32 Further, for all patent applications
filed after June 8, 1995, patentees could not take advantage of the URAA's
automatic alternative term calculation that is available for applications
filed prior to this date and were bound instead to the new twenty-years-
from-filing term.33 In response to these concerns, the Patent Term
27 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1).
28 id.
29 See generally MPEP, ch. 2700 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-2700.pdf; U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Questions and
Answers Regarding the GATT Uruguay Round and NAFTA Changes to US. Patent Law
and Practice (Feb. 23, 1995), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/uruguay/
QA.html.
30 MPEP, supra note 29, § 2701. This extension takes place automatically and
simultaneously with the extension of the first patent.
31 id
32 See Dana Rohrabacher, Pennies for Thoughts: How GATT Fast Track Harms
American Patent Applicants, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 491, 494-95 (1996).
33 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1).
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Guarantee Act,3 4 a subset of the American Inventors Protection Act,35 was
passed in 1999.
The Patent Term Guarantee Act applies to patent applications filed on
or after May 29, 2000, and provides for an adjustment of a patent's term
based on USPTO delays in processing the application.36 The statute and
accompanying regulations recognize processing delays by category
(commonly referred to as A-, B-, and C-type delays): A-type-failure to
act; B-type--delays resulting in the pendency of an application for more
than three years; and C-type-delays arising from interferences, successful
appeals, and secrecy orders. Under the failure to act provisions, the
USPTO is required to take certain processing actions by specified
deadlines. A one-day adjustment is added to the patent term for each day
beyond the deadline that the USPTO fails to take a given action (A-type
delay). 8 Under the three-year pendency provisions, a one-day adjustment
is added to the patent term for each day beyond three years from the date
of filing that the patent is not issued (B-type delay).39 Under the delays
arising from interferences, appeals, and secrecy order provisions (C-type
delay), a one-day adjustment is added to the patent term for each day that
the patent application is delayed due to one of these proceedings.40
Positive adjustments are reduced by any delays attributable to patent
applicants. 4 1 There is no cap on the amount of time that can be added to
34 Patent Term Guarantee Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I, 113 Stat. 1501A-
557 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)). See also John B. Campbell, Jr., What's
the Deal Now? A Business Perspective Analysis of the U.S. Patent System and Recent
Changes to the Patent Laws, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 293, 316-17 (2002).
3s American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I, 113 Stat.
1501A-552.
36 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1).
37 Id. § 154(b)(1)(A)-C). The provisions permitting adjustments for C-type delays
were actually implemented by the URAA itself. Therefore, such adjustments are available
for patents filed after June 8, 1995, but prior to May 29, 2000. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)
(1994).
" 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A).
39 Id. § 154(b)(1)(B). This provision effectively "guarantees" that a patent term under
the post-URAA term calculation will not be less than the pre-URAA seventeen-year term-
hence the legislation's title, the "Patent Guarantee Act." Id.
40 Id. § 154(b)(1)(C).
41 Id § 154(b)(2)(C). Examples of such applicant delays include late payment of
application fees, failure to respond to USPTO notices or actions within a three-month grace
period, and filing a reply with the USPTO that contains an inadvertent omission. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.704 (2012).
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the patent term pursuant to these adjustments.4 2 Further, these adjustments
are calculated automatically by the USPTO without request from the
patentee.43
1. Availability of a USPTO Delay Adjustment for a Patent Previously
Adjusted Under the URAA
A patent that has received a term adjustment under the URAA
transition provisions may not also take advantage of a term adjustment due
to USPTO delay. Both the relevant statutes and USPTO regulations
preclude this result. The Patent Term Guarantee Act, which provides for
adjustments due to USPTO delay, applies only to patent applications filed
on or after May 29, 2000." In contrast, under the URAA, a patent must
have been filed before June 8, 1995, to take advantage of a URAA
adjustment. 4 5 Thus, in many cases, a single patent will not be eligible to
take advantage of both of these adjustments. Due to a special type of
patent application called a continuation, wherein a later application
benefits from of an earlier filing date,4 6 it is sometimes possible, at least in
theory, for a patent to be eligible for both types of adjustments. USPTO
regulations, however, make it clear that a patent may not claim an
adjustment for USPTO delay if it has already benefitted from a URAA
adjustment, even if such an adjustment would otherwise be available.47
2. Availability of a USPTO Delay Adjustment for a Terminally
Disclaimed Patent
In general, a patent that has been terminally disclaimed to an earlier
patent to avoid obviousness-type double patenting issues may not obtain a
term adjustment under § 154(b) even if the USPTO has delayed the
42 See Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
43 37 C.F.R. § 1.705. Patentees may request a correction if they believe that the
adjustment was calculated incorrectly, and in fact, should request such a correction if an
error is made in their favor because such favorable errors may provide the basis for
inequitable conduct claims against patentees. See id.
4 Karin L. Tyson & Robert W. Bahr, Patent Term Guarantee Overview, U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 4, 2009, 6:18 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/aipa/ptal
patent termguarantee.jsp. Similarly, the availability for adjustments due to C-type delays
implemented by the URAA apply to patents filed after June 8, 1995. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(c)(1).
45 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1).
46 Continuation applications are explained in more detail infra Part II.D.
47 See MPEP, supra note 29, § 2701.
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48prosecution of the terminally disclaimed patent. Section 154(b)(2)(B) of
the Patent Guarantee Act states: "No patent the term of which has been
disclaimed beyond a specified date may be adjusted under this section
beyond the expiration date specified in the disclaimer." 49 The Federal
Circuit in Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co.,5o explained that this
section "expressly excludes patents in which a terminal disclaimer was
filed from the benefit of a term adjustment for PTO delays."51
a. If a Reference Patent Has Received an Adjustment for USPTO
Delay
An exception to the general rule precluding a terminally disclaimed
patent from claiming an adjustment for USPTO delay applies when the
reference patent to which the later patent has been disclaimed is granted
such an adjustment.52 In this case, according to USPTO practice, the
terminally disclaimed patent may also benefit from an adjustment for
USPTO delay if two conditions are met.
First, the terminally disclaimed patent must independently qualify for
such an adjustment.54 To illustrate this requirement, consider a patent p
that has been terminally disclaimed with reference to patent a, such that a
and P have the same expiration date D. If patent a qualifies for a § 154(b)
adjustment because of statute-specified delays during prosecution, then a's
expiration date will be adjusted to D + adjustment = Da. However,
although patent 1 is terminally disclaimed to patent a, P does not
automatically reap the benefit of a's extension. Instead, O's expiration date
remains at date D and will not be adjusted unless there were also delays in
prosecuting patent 1 that independently entitle it to a § 154(b) adjustment.
If this is the case, patent P's new expiration date will not be D,, but some
other date, Dp, determined by the qualifying delays accrued during the
prosecution of P.
Second, the adjusted expiration date of the terminally disclaimed
patent must not extend beyond the adjusted expiration of the reference
patent.55 Using the previous example, this means that patent 1 can qualify
48 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(B).
49 id.
5 482 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
5' Id. at 1322.
52 See Hinkens, supra note 8, at 380-81.
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for an adjustment in time up to, but not later than, D,, even if delays in the
prosecution of patent 13 qualify it for a later expiration. Although this
situation has not been litigated, the USPTO most likely adopts this stance
based on the same statutory language used by the Federal Circuit in Hi-
Tech to explain the general rule precluding a terminally disclaimed patent
from qualifying for a § 154(b) adjustment. 6
C. The Hatch- Waxman Act
1. Generally
A third statutory mechanism for extending the duration of a patent is
available to pharmaceutical products, medical devices, and other products
subject to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory review under
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act.57 This
statute, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, was passed in 1984
in response to concerns that the proper balancing of incentives and public
access sought by the patent system was not being achieved in the
pharmaceutical industry.58 This imbalance resulted from an interaction of
regulatory requirements and patent law doctrines, and served to stifle
public access to new drugs.59 In particular, the FDA's requirement that
each new pharmaceutical product undergo clinical testing demonstrating
the product's safety and efficacy as part of a New Drug Application
(NDA) before being approved for marketing and sale was problematic for
would-be competitors of patented drugs. Such testing is often
prohibitively expensive for firms that cannot recoup these costs via patent
monopoly pricing. 60 The problem was further exacerbated by the fact that
any efforts by generic manufacturers to comply with these regulatory
requirements would in all likelihood infringe the competitor's patent.
Under the Federal Circuit's holding in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
56 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(B) (2006).
57 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman
Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
5 Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HAST'NGS L.J.
171, 174-77 (2008).
59 Id. at 174-75.
6o See id.; Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability,
87 TEx. L. REv. 503, 509-11 (2009).
61 Avery, supra note 58, at 175.
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Pharmaceutical Co.,62 these efforts did not qualify as non-infringing
experimental uses.63 Thus, any potential competitor not deterred by the
cost of clinical trials would still be forced to wait until its competitor's
patent expired before beginning these trials. Because the trials take several
years, the patentee's monopoly was effectively extended, and competition
and access were stifled for the extended time period.64
To end this effective extension of patent monopolies in the drug
industry and restore the balance of research incentives and public access,
the Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic drug manufacturers to take
advantage of an accelerated regulatory approval process, called an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).65 Rather than conducting
clinical trials for a pharmaceutical product from scratch, a generic drug
manufacturer may receive marketing approval for a drug based solely on a
showing that the product is biologically equivalent to a patented drug. 66
Costly barriers to competition are thereby removed. Further, the Hatch-
Waxman Act overruled the Federal Circuit's holding in Roche, such that a
generic manufacturer may conduct the necessary tests required to file an
ANDA without infringing a competitor's patent.67 A generic manufacturer
can thus be ready with an FDA-approved marketable product at the
moment the competitor's patent expires.6 8
62 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
3 Id at 863.
6 Avery, supra note 58, at 175.
65 See 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2006).
66 Id. § 355()(2)(A)(iv). The reasoning is as follows: Because clinical trials
demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the patented drug were conducted prior to that
drug's approval, the trials do not need to be conducted again for the generic product after
showing that the two drugs are biologically equivalent. See Avery, supra note 58, at 174-
75.
67 Avery, supra note 58, at 176. Hatch-Waxman designates tests that are conducted
with the goal of acquiring FDA approval as experimental uses. Id.
68 See id. Hatch-Waxman further incents competition by allowing a generic
manufacturer to challenge the validity of its competitor's patent prior to the patent's
expiration. Id. at 176-77. If the challenger is successful, either because the pioneer's
patent is deemed invalid or because the generic manufacturer's product is deemed not to
infringe the pioneer's patent, the generic manufacturer is rewarded with a 180-day
exclusivity period. Id. The pharmaceutical industry has abused this system-broadly
referred to as "Paragraph IV litigation" in reference to the relevant section of the statute-
leading Congress to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2003. See id. at 184. A complete
discussion of the policy implications of Paragraph IV litigation and the efficacy of the 2003
(continued)
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2. Hatch- Waxman Extension Provisions
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides to pharmaceutical innovators the
possibility of a patent term extension as quid pro quo for shouldering the
burden of conducting clinical trials and enduring regulatory review for the
benefit of their generic competitors. In particular, a patented drug is
eligible for a patent term extension equal to the duration of the NDA
regulatory review period plus half the duration of any Investigational New
Drug (IND) regulatory review period.70 The maximum extension available
under these provisions depends on the patent's issue date. If both a drug
patent issued and clinical testing for such drug began prior to the
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act on September 25, 1984, then the
maximum available extension is two years. 71  For patents issued after
September 24, 1984,72 and for patents issued before this date but for which
clinical trials had not yet begun, the maximum available extension is five
years, and the final expiration date of the patent can be no more than
fourteen years after the date of first FDA approval.74
amendments in curbing abuses of the Paragraph IV system is beyond the scope of this
Article, but has been discussed elsewhere. E.g., id. at 179-86.
69 Hatch-Waxman also requires that the pioneer drug manufacturer share its clinical
trial data with these competitors. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 156.
70 Theresa J. Lechner-Fish, Comment, The Hatch- Waxman System: Suffering a Plague
of Bad Behavior, 5 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 372, 392 (2005); Investigational New Drug
(IND) Application, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugs
aredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/investigationalnewdrugindapplication/
default.htm (last updated Apr. 25, 2013). A demonstration of no unreasonable risk to
research subjects is required to receive an IND certification. Id. Once certified, the drug
may be transported across state lines in preparation for clinical trials. See id
" See 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(C). The rationale for this abbreviated extension for drugs
already in clinical trials is to focus on incentivizing innovation of future drugs rather than
rewarding past innovation. Lechner-Fish, supra note 70, at 392.
72 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A).
7 Id. § 156(g)(6)(B).
74 Id. § 156(c)(3). The average duration of an NDA review by the FDA is fifteen to
sixteen months. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch- Waxman Act and Its Impact
on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 192 (1999).
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3. Concurrent Availability ofa Hatch- Waxman Extension and a
URAA Adjustment
The rules governing the concurrent availability of a Hatch-Waxman
extension and an adjustment under the URAA were outlined by the Federal
Circuit in Merck & Co. v. Kessler.75
a. Availability of a Hatch- Waxman Extension and a URAA
Adjustment for a Patent Not Yet Expired on June 8, 1995
The Federal Circuit in Kessler considered whether a patent that had
previously qualified for but not yet used a Hatch-Waxman extension by
June 8, 1995, could take advantage of a URAA adjustment while
maintaining the Hatch-Waxman extension. The court disagreed with the
position taken by both the USPTO and the FDA and held that such a patent
could indeed take advantage of both a URAA adjustment and a Hatch-
Waxman extension.n
b. Availability of a Hatch- Waxman Extension and a URAA
Adjustment for a Patent in Force on June 8, 1995, Solely Due
to a Hatch- Waxman Extension
The court in Kessler also considered whether a patent in force on June
8, 1995, solely because of a partially-expended Hatch-Waxman extension,
could receive a URAA adjustment and also have the full term of the
previously granted Hatch-Waxman extension added onto the newly
adjusted term.78 The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court and
held that such a patent may not have a full Hatch-Waxman extension
renewed after a URAA adjustment has been made. 7 9 Further, the court
decided that such a patent could not "split" a Hatch-Waxman extension
pre- and post-URAA adjustment.80 For example, if a patent has utilized six
months of a two-year Hatch-Waxman extension when the patent term is
adjusted in accordance with the URAA, the patent loses the remaining
eighteen months of the Hatch-Waxman extension.
15 80 F.3d 1543, 1550-53 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
76 Id. at 1550.
" Id. at 1550-52.
71 Id. at 1552-53.
79 id
s0 Id. at 1552.
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4. Availability of a Hatch- Waxman Extension for a Terminally
Disclaimed Patent
The potential availability of a Hatch-Waxman extension for a
terminally disclaimed patent was addressed by the Federal Circuit in Hi-
Tech.81 In Hi-Tech, the patent at issue had been terminally disclaimed to a
reference patent to avoid a finding of obviousness-type double patenting;
both patents thus expired on the same date.82 The Federal Circuit found
that such an extension was permissible despite the fact that the disclaimed
patent and the reference patent would now expire on different dates.83
Therefore, a patentee may seek a Hatch-Waxman extension of a terminally
disclaimed patent and thereby extend the expiration of the disclaimed
patent beyond the expiration date of the reference patent.
5. Availability ofa Hatch- Waxman Extension for a Patent Adjusted
for USPTO Delay
The Federal Circuit has not explicitly addressed whether a Hatch-
Waxman extension is available for a patent previously adjusted for USPTO
delay under § 154(b). It is clear based on express statutory language,
however, that a patent may be granted both a Hatch-Waxman extension
and an adjustment for USPTO delay. The statutory provision governing
Hatch-Waxman extensions states: "The term of a patent ... shall be
extended in accordance with this section from the original expiration date
of the patent, which shall include any patent term adjustment granted
under section 154(b), . . . .84 This suggests that a patent previously
adjusted under § 154(b) is eligible for a Hatch-Waxman extension if the
requirements for such an extension are met.
6. Availability of More than One Hatch- Waxman Extension for a
Single Product
According to the language of the Hatch-Waxman Act, a patentee may
not receive more than one Hatch-Waxman extension for a single patent.
81 Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., 482 F.3d 1317, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
821 d. at 1318-19.
83 Id. at 1324.
84 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
85 See id. § 156(a)(2). This section states that a patent may not receive a Hatch-
Waxman extension if it has been "extended under subsection (e)(1) of this section." Id.




Further, a patentee may not obtain more than one Hatch-Waxman
extension for a given regulatory review of a product, even if there is more
than one patent covering that product.86 Finally, a drug must be classified
as "new" to be eligible for a Hatch-Waxman extension,8 7 with "new"
defined as a drug that has not previously been approved for marketing by
the FDA. These rules together generally preclude the possibility of more
than one Hatch-Waxman extension being granted to a single product. In
narrow circumstances, however, a single product can reap the benefit of
two or more Hatch-Waxman extensions.89 Such circumstances exist when
a single drug undergoes more than one regulatory review, each regulatory
review corresponds to a separate patent application," and each regulatory
review period terminates on the same date.9' This last requirement renders
it unlikely that such a situation will arise with any frequency; however, it
has arisen at least once.92 In one case, the drug Lyrica was undergoing
regulatory review for two uses: to treat diabetes-related neuropathic pain,
and separately, to treat herpes-zoster-related neuropathic pain.93  The
NDAs for each of these uses were approved on the same date, and the
holder of the relevant patents, Warner-Lambert Company, argued that each
patent should qualify for a Hatch-Waxman extension because there was no
previous regulatory approval of the same drug to prevent each drug from
being classified as "new" under the statute.94 The USPTO and FDA
receive only one [Hatch-Waxman] extension." Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543,
1551 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
8 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(4) ("[l]n no event shall more than one patent be extended under
subsection (e)(1) for the same regulatory review period for any product.").
87 Id. § 156(f)(2)(A).
8 See id. § 156(a)(5)(A).
8 Jeffrey S. Boone, Patent Term Extensions for Human Drugs Under the US Hatch-
Waxman Act, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRACTICE, 658,662-63 (2009).
90 This could occur, for example, if a single drug product is undergoing clinical trials
for more than one indication, and a separate patent has been obtained for each use of the
drug. See id. at 662.
91 See id. Because each regulatory review period ends on the same date, each patent in
this case may claim that it involves a "new" drug under the statute because the same drug
has not been previously approved.
92 See id. at 662-63.
9 Id. at 662.
94 Id. at 662-63.
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agreed with this reasoning and granted an extension for each of the
patents.95
D. Continuations
Strictly speaking, a patent continuation is not an extension of a patent
term. However, patent continuations interact in important ways with the
term adjustments discussed in this Article, and a. discussion of the
implications of these interactions is warranted. Briefly, a patent
continuation is a mechanism whereby a patent applicant can "reset" the
patent prosecution process following a final rejection of a patent
application or at any other time prior to the patent issuing or applicant
abandoning the application.96 Following a final rejection, a continuation
provides a means of having an application reconsidered, in most cases by
the same patent examiner. 97 Following an allowance of one or more
claims, a continuation allows an applicant to pursue claims broader than
those that were allowed for possible later issue.98  A continuation
application provides an attractive alternative to filing a new application for
these broader claims because the continuation application effectively
continues the initial application, allowing an applicant to claim the initial
filing date for these claims, and thereby avoiding the possibility that
intervening innovations (or the parent application itself) will act as prior art
that renders the later, broader claims unpatentable. 99 There is no limit to
the number of continuation applications that may be filed. 00
9
' Id. at 663.
96 Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84
B.U. L. Rev. 63, 68 (2004).
9 Id. A patent application facing a final rejection of its claims may also appeal this
finding before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 6(b) (West 2012). In
fact, the appeal process is the formal mechanism contemplated for appealing final
rejections, and some consider the continuation process to be an inappropriate mechanism
for appeal. Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 97. For a complete discussion of abuses of
the continuation system, see generally id.
98 Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 68.
99 See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006); Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 81.
100 There have been many attempts-both legislative and administrative-to limit the
number of available continuations. The most recent attempt was in 2007, when the USPTO
proposed new regulations that would limit the number of available continuations arising
from a single parent application. Changes To Practice for Continued Examination Filings,
Patent Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in




Various types of patent continuations exist, and each may be treated
differently under the law of patent adjustments. The main categories of
continuation applications include continuations, requests for continued
examination (RCEs, which are technically a subset of continuations),
continuations-in-part (ClIPs), and divisionals.o'0 Applicants file traditional
continuation applications when they wish to argue for broader claims after
some claims have been allowed. When no claims have been allowed and a
final rejection has been issued, a continuation is labeled as an RCE.102 In
contrast to traditional continuations and RCEs, a CIP application allows
the applicant to add new information to the continuation application.10 3
For CIPs, the priority date of the parent application is only available for
those claims that do not make use of this additional information.'"
Finally, a divisional application is usually filed following a finding by the
USPTO that a single patent application contains two or more distinct
inventions.' 05  The patentee may then file multiple related divisional
applications, one for each distinct invention.10 6
1. Availability ofa URAA Adjustment for a Patent Based on a
Continuation Application
The general rule governing term adjustments under the URAA is that a
patent filed prior to June 8, 1995, receives a term corresponding to the
greater of seventeen years from issue or twenty years from filing. 0 7 For a
patent based on a continuation application, the rule is slightly different. If
a patent is based on a continuation application filed after June 8, 1995, the
patent does not benefit from an alternative term calculation and is granted
district court issued an injunction, preventing the agency from implementing these rules.
Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808, 817 (E.D. Va. 2008). The Federal Circuit
vacated this injunction in Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009), but the
USPTO later withdrew the proposed regulation changes. Press Release 09-21, U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, USPTO Rescinds Controversial Patent Regulations Package
Proposed by Previous Administration (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.uspto.gov/news/09-21.jsp.
'' See 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2012).
102 See id. § 1.114(a).
103 See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a); Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
10 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Continental Grp., Inc., 525 F. Supp. 950, 970 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
'0 35 U.S.C. § 121.
106 See id.
'
0 7 See id. § 154(c)(1).
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a term of twenty years from filing, even if the initial application on which
the continuation is based was filed prior to the URAA cutoff date.os The
continuation patent still claims the priority date of the parent application;
thus, the patent's term is twenty years from the date of original filing, even
though that date is prior to June 8, 1995.109
2. Terminal Disclaimer of a Patent Based on a Continuation
Application
A patent based on a continuation application may be terminally
disclaimed just as a patent based on an original application may be
terminally disclaimed."10 In fact, the terminal disclaimer once played a
central role in situations where a continuation was filed in an attempt to
patent broader claims after related narrower claims had been allowed."'
Broader claims in the continuation application were often unpatentable in
light of the parent patent for obviousness-type double patenting reasons;
the problem was solved by disclaiming the terminal portion of the child
patent.'12 The past tense is used here because following the passage of the
URAA, the terminal disclaimer lost much of its practical effect in the case
of continuation applications. 13  Although obviousness-type double
patenting is still a concern with continuation applications, and terminal
disclaimers must still be used to overcome this concern,"l4 the parent and
child patents will often expire on the same date. Simultaneous expiration
occurs even without the disclaimer because expiration for both child and
parent is calculated from the date the parent was filed. Parent and child
patents do not always expire on the same date, however, because of the
potential availability of other extensions and adjustments. Moreover, as
Part III discusses, the terminal disclaimer may serve a useful purpose even
when there is no patent term to be disclaimed.
108 MPEP, supra note 29, § 2701.
109 Id.
no See 35 U.S.C. § 253.
11 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 87 n.92.
11 2 id.
113 Id.
114 MPEP, supra note 29, § 804.02.
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3. Availability ofa Hatch- Waxman Extension for a Patent Based on a
Continuation Application
A patent based on a continuation application must meet all of the
statutory requirements to qualify for a Hatch-Waxman extension."' These
statutory requirements include restrictions on the availability of an
extension for related patents and products.1 6 In practice, this means that a
Hatch-Waxman extension is usually granted to the earliest patent in a
series of related patents, and a patent based on a continuation application is
thus ineligible for an extension. For example, the Hatch-Waxman Act
requires that only one extension be issued per regulatory review period.117
Therefore, if a child patent includes claims related to the same compound
as the parent patent, there was a single regulatory review of this
compound, and the parent patent claimed a Hatch-Waxman extension
based on this regulatory delay, then the child patent cannot also claim a
§ 156(a) extension." 8
4. Availability of a USPTO Delay Adjustment for a Patent Based on a
Continuation Application
The rules governing the availability of a patent term adjustment based
on USPTO delay for a continuation application depend upon both the type
of continuation and the type of delay. First, a continuation application
generally extinguishes any patent term adjustment for USPTO delay that
has accrued before the continuation application was filed.'19 This rule
applies to continuation, CIP, and divisional applications (but not to RCEs),
and includes all three types of potential USPTO delay (A, B, and C). 2 0
For example, if a continuation application is filed after some claims have
been allowed to argue for broader claims in a child patent, the parent
us See 35 U.S.C. § 156.
"1 See id. § 156(a)(2), (c)(4).
"
7 Id. § 156(c)(4).
" However, the Hatch-Waxman Act does not prohibit an owner of multiple patents
that are all based on a single regulatory review period from choosing which of the patents
will reap the benefit of the § 156 extension. For example, if a child patent issues, which
includes broader claims than the parent patent, then the patentee could claim an extension
for the child patent and reap the benefit of longer protection for the broader claims. Cardiac
Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1384, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
"9 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.704(c)(12) (2013) (stating that in the case of further prosecution
via a continuing application, the period of adjustment "shall not include any period that is
prior to the actual filing date of the application that resulted in the patent").
120 See discussion supra Part II.B, II.D.
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patent may be adjusted for delays accruing prior to its issuance, but the
child patent may not.
This general rule does not apply to RCE applications.12 1 Unlike other
types of continuations, an RCE application filed after a final rejection does
not extinguish previously accrued adjustments of A-type, B-type, and C-
type delays.122 Once an RCE has been filed, however, any further accrual
of B-type delay is precluded.12 3 In other words, the three-year pendency
clock is effectively stopped, although adjustments for subsequent delays
resulting from USPTO failure to act and appeals may still be granted.
E. Other Specific Extensions
Finally, an individual patent covering a drug, food product, or medical
device may potentially benefit from an additional extension based on
regulatory delay. Sections 155 and 155A provided for extension of a
patent's term in certain situations wherein regulatory approval was stayed
or denied pursuant to FDA authority.12 4 These sections were very narrow
in scope,125 and were recently repealed by the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act of 2011.126 Additionally, Congress has occasionally passed a
private bill granting an extension to a single patent on the basis of extreme
regulatory delay that left the patentee with a significantly truncated patent
period.12 7
121 See Tyson & Bahr, supra note 44.
122 id.
123 id
124 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 155, 155A (2006).
125 These provisions basically acted as private laws, as the conditions for qualification
were drafted with specific products in mind and applied narrowly only to these products.
For example, the only product to take advantage of § 155 before it was repealed was the
food product Aspartame, while the only product to take advantage of § 155A was the drug
Forane. Patent Terms Extended Under 35 USC § 155, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/terms/155.jsp (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
126 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 20(k), 125 Stat.
284, 335.
127 See, e.g., H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBcoMM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, &
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, 96TH CONG., THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE PATENT LEGISLATION IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Comm. Print 1979) (authored by Christine P. Benagh of the
American Law Division of the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service).
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III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT TERM ADJUSTMENTS
The U.S. patent system provides for various adjustments of the default
patent term of twenty years from filing, and these adjustments interact in
ways that are not always clear to patent holders or their competitors.
Perhaps even less clear is whether the law that has developed in this area
serves the policy goals of the patent system by maintaining an appropriate
balance between incentives to innovate and access to information. This
part, mirroring the structure of Part II, examines each of the doctrines
introduced in Part II, traces the evolution of each doctrine, including any
relevant decisions in the Federal Circuit, and evaluates whether the current
state of the law is in fact consistent with the goals of the patent system.
A. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act
1. Generally
The URAA changed the patent term in the United States from an
issuance-based term to a filing-based term. 12 8 In particular, the default
patent term was seventeen years from the date of patent issuance, but now
after the URAA's enactment, the default term is twenty years from the date
of filing. 129  This move to a filing-based term was not universally
applauded;130 however, some positive results did flow from this change.
First, it was a step towards accomplishing one of the main goals of the
TRIPs agreement: to achieve a more uniform and harmonized international
patent system.'3 1 Second, the transition to a patent term calculated from
the date of filing helped remedy an abuse of the U.S. patent system known
as submarine patenting.132
Submarine patenting is the act of filing multiple continuation
applications, intending to delay the ultimate issuance of a patent until a
later time when the patent is likely much more valuable.133 Prior to the
128 Hasson, supra note 4, at 383.
129 d
130 Many of the criticisms centered around the worry that patentees would be deprived
of a full seventeen-year term under the new regime. See, e.g., Rohrabacher, supra note 32,
at 494-95. This particular concern spurred passage of the Patent Term Guarantee Act.
Campbell, supra note 34, at 306-07.
131 For a discussion of how successful the URAA actually has been in achieving this
goal, see Hasson, supra note 4.
132 Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 79-80.
133 Id. This increased value arises because other innovators in the industry, unaware of
the submarine patent's existence, may invest significant resources to develop products and
(continued)
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URAA, when the patent term was calculated from the date of patent
issuance, an owner of a submarine patent could delay issuance indefinitely,
waiting until the patent became most valuable-all without penalty.
The practice of submarine patenting does not serve the goals of the
patent system. While it rewards the initial innovator and owner of the
submarine patent, it does so disproportionately by allowing the patentee to
extend the monopoly indefinitely. Further, it discourages subsequent
innovators who may be reluctant to invest significant resources in the
development of improvements on existing technologies for fear of being
held up in the future by an undiscovered submarine patent. 13 4 The change
in patent term under the URAA helps discourage the practice of submarine
patenting because a patentee is granted a term of twenty years from filing
regardless of when the patent actually issues. Further, under the rules for
USPTO delay-based adjustments,135 any delays in issuance attributable to
the patentee are not eligible to extend the term of the patent, and filing a
continuation application cuts off the benefit of any previously accrued
adjustments for USPTO delays. 13 6 In effect, a patentee loses a portion of
the patent term to the same extent that the patentee delays patent issuance;
if the patentee delays for more than twenty years, then all patent rights are
lost.
The change in patent term under the URAA has not completely
eliminated the practice of submarine patenting.13 7  In some cases it is
worthwhile for a patentee to forfeit a portion of the patent term to reap the
increased value that comes from surprising and holding up competitors and
subsequent innovators.13 8 This may be particularly true in industries where
the rate of technological advancement is rapid in relation to the patent term
because a short time is all that is needed to create the holdup situation
described above. For this reason, there have been attempts by both the
legislature and the USPTO to limit the number of continuation applications
services that rely on the submarine patent's technology. Id. at 79. After these investments
are made, the innovators will be willing to pay much more to the owner of the submarine
patent in license fees than they would have absent these investments. Id.
134 See id. at 80.
135 See discussion supra Part I.B.
136 This is not true in the case of an RCE continuation application. RCE continuation
applications are used only when the initial application for a patent is rejected, and are
therefore, not relevant to the practice of submarine patenting.
137 Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 84-85.
.. Id at 85.
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available for a single patent, as permitting an unlimited number of
continuations primarily facilitates submarine patenting.139
A major critique of the switch from an issuance-based term calculation
to a filing-based term calculation is that patent terms vary under the new
system based on prosecution times.14 0  This introduces uncertainty for
potential inventors and may reduce incentives to innovate. The system
switch also implicates fairness concerns because two different patents may
benefit from differing patent terms for reasons unrelated to the respective
social value of the patented technologies. Although additional legislation
adjusting patent terms based on regulatory and administrative delays in
patent issuance may help to alleviate such concerns, it does not present a
complete solution.1 4 '
2. The URAA Alternative Term Calculation
If the URAA, switching to a filing-based term calculation, can be
considered a positive development in the law, it might follow that a
provision aiming to gather as many unexpired patents as possible under its
auspices is also beneficial. That is what the URAA adjustment provisions
aim to do by automatically recalculating the term of any unexpired patent
issued prior to the URAA's enactment to conform to the new law. 142 The
only pre-URAA patents that are excluded from such a recalculation are
those that would suffer a reduced patent term under the new law.143
Although this initially appears to be an appropriate and fair means of
transitioning to a new system, these statutory provisions, in all likelihood,
have succeeded in little more than introducing unnecessary complexity to
the patent system. Increased complexity is evidenced by the USPTO's and
139 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, for an account of the USPTO's latest attempt
to limit continuations.
140 See, e.g., Rohrabacher, supra note 32, at 495-96. For example, a patent that takes
one year to issue will benefit from a nineteen-year term, while a patent that only takes six
months to issue will benefit from an additional six months of patent protection.
141 For example, as seen in this Article, such legislation also introduces complications
and uncertainty, especially when several independent adjustment provisions interact in
ways that are unclear to patentees and their competitors. Patent terms may still vary
because of reasons unrelated to the social value of the patent or the incentives needed to
spur the development of the invention.
142 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2006).
143 Id. This would include patents that issued more than three years after filing, such
that a seventeen-years-from-issuance term provides a longer term than a twenty-years-from-
filing term.
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the Federal Circuit's struggles to determine how URAA provisions should
interact with other term extensions and adjustments.'" Further, the Act
has granted a windfall to pre-URAA patent owners with patents that-by
luck or otherwise-have spent less than three years in prosecution.
Because these patentees only expected a seventeen-year term when they
developed the patented inventions, the additional term granted by the
URAA adjustment was not necessary to incentivize their development.
Although the URAA adjustment provisions accelerated the international
uniformity sought by the TRIPs agreement, it arguably would have done
little harm in this respect simply to have allowed pre-URAA patents to
expire after their seventeen-year terms, while holding all post-URAA
patents to the new term calculation.14 5 Under such an approach, all pre-
URAA patents would have expired as of June 8, 2012. As it now stands,
many pre-URAA patents still survive,146 and the complexities introduced
by the URAA alternative term calculation continue to manifest themselves.
3. The Availability of a URAA Extension for a Terminally Disclaimed
Patent
The rule governing the availability of a URAA adjustment for a
terminally disclaimed patent is as follows: If a patent to which a second
patent is terminally disclaimed is granted a term adjustment pursuant to the
URAA, then the second, terminally disclaimed patent gets the benefit of
this new expiration date only if the disclaimer expressly references the
"full statutory term" of the first patent.14 7  If the terminal disclaimer
'4See generally Part III for a description of these struggles.
145 This would not have delayed the improvement to the abusive practice of submarine
patenting because this practice depends on the successive filing of continuation
applications; all continuations filed after June 8, 1995, based on a pre-URAA patent,
however, automatically receive a twenty-years-from-filing term. See MPEP, supra note 29,
§ 2701.
146 In 2004, the number of pre-URAA patents was estimated at 1.3 million. Lemley &
Moore, supra note 96, at 83-84 n.81. That number shrinks every year as pre-URAA
patents expire. One recent estimate surmised that of an estimated 2.1 million patents
currently in force, 9% of these were issued prior to the URAA cutoff, leaving about
200,000 pre-URAA patents in force today. Dennis Crouch, How Many US Patents Are In-
Force?, PATENTLY-O (May 4, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/05/how-many-
us-patents-are-in-force.html. This estimate does not include pre-URAA patents that may
have received other extensions, so the number is probably an underestimate. See id.
147 MPEP, supra note 29, § 2701.
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references a specific date, then the terminally disclaimed patent expires on
that date, regardless of any URAA term extension of the first patent.148
This distinction based on the language of the terminal disclaimer came
about as a result of the legislative history underlying the passage of the
URAA. 149 The relevant statutory provision states only that any term
extension calculation under the URAA is "subject to" any preexisting
terminal disclaimers. 50 A Senate Report on the subject goes into greater
detail, distinguishing between a patent that is terminally disclaimed "due to
another patent on an invention that is not patentably distinct from" the
terminally disclaimed patent and a patent that is terminally disclaimed
"independent of another patent." 5' According to this report, the first type
of patent gains the URAA extension of the reference patent, while the
second type of patent is bound to the "originally disclaimed period." 52
The USPTO implements this distinction as follows: A patent with a
terminal disclaimer referencing an earlier patent is extended concurrent
with the reference patent, while a patent with a disclaimer referencing a
specific date realizes no extension.15 3
Although one may question whether it is wise to adjust the expiration
date of the reference patent under the URAA's alternative term calculation
in the first place,' 54 once this adjustment has been made it makes sense, in
light of the purpose of the terminal disclaimer, to grant the terminally
disclaimed patent a concurrent adjustment. The goal of a terminal
disclaimer is to ensure that a patentee does not inappropriately extend the
monopoly beyond the term of an original patent by patenting obvious
iterations of the original invention.'5 5 No such risk is implicated when the
term of the original patent has been adjusted subsequent to an unforeseen
statute. Further, keeping the expiration dates of both patents identical
148 d
149 Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 298 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting S.
REP. No. 103-412, at 229 (1994)).
'so 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1). The statute provides that the new patent term under the
URAA for qualifying patents would be "the greater of the 20-year term as provided in
subsection (a), or 17 years from grant, subject to any terminal disclaimers." Id.
' S. REP. No. 103-412, at 229 (1994).
152 id
'53 See MPEP, supra note 29, § 2701.
154 See Part III.A.2 for a discussion of this issue.
1ss In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 943-44 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting In re Schneller,
397 F.2d 350, 354 (C.C.P.A. 1968)).
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avoids unnecessary confusion and complexity and is consistent with the
reasonable expectations of both patentees and their competitors.
In light of this rationale, it is unclear why the USPTO's current
practice of determining a terminally disclaimed patent's eligibility for a
URAA adjustment based on express language in the disclaimer is
necessary. Although the Senate Report distinguishes between terminal
disclaimers that are "due to" an earlier patent and those that are
"independent of" an earlier patent, it is unclear why a patentee would
disclaim a portion of a patent other than to avoid an obviousness-type
double patenting rejection based on an earlier patent.' 56 In other words,
most terminally disclaimed patents are likely "due to" a reference patent,
although the text of the disclaimer may not unambiguously reveal this fact.
Consistent with this rationale, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's
affirmation of a USPTO finding that a terminal disclaimer ambiguously
including both a specific date of disclaimer and a reference to an earlier
patent could have its expiration date adjusted under the URAA concurrent
with the reference patent.'57  The USPTO regularly interprets such
ambiguities in favor of the terminally disclaimed patent holder. 5 8  The
Federal Circuit reasoned that it would be unfair to deny the patentee an
extension simply for failure to include specific language-the significance
of which could not be appreciated at the time of filing-in the terminal
disclaimer.15 9 In light of this reasoning, it seems equally unfair to deny an
extension to a patentee who, equally unaware of the significance of
including specific language in the terminal disclaimer at the time of filing,
156 The defendants in Bayer presented an example where a "patent owner .. . select[ed]
a specific date upon which it w[ould] disclaim a term of a patent." Bayer AG v. Carlsbad
Tech., Inc., Civ. No. 01-867-B (LSP), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24487, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Oct.
31, 2001), aff'd, 298 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The district court agreed with the USPTO
that the URAA did not affect the expiration of this patent, but it was unclear why the patent
owner in this case selected this date. Id. at *18-19. It may well have been that this date
was chosen as the date upon which an earlier reference patent expired, and the patent owner
simply failed to mention the reference patent in the disclaimer. See id. at * 18.
15 Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 298 F.3d 1377, 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
158 See MPEP, supra note 29, § 2701 (stating that a terminally disclaimed patent will
not be adjusted under the URAA "if the terminal disclaimer . .. disclaims the terminal
portion of the patent subsequent to a specific date, without reference to the full statutory
term ofa referenced patent" (emphasis added)).
"' See Bayer, 298 F.3d at 1382. The district court also pointed out that the USPTO
does not require any specific language for a terminal disclaimer to be properly filed. Bayer,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24487, at *17-18.
474 [41:445
PATENT TERM ADJUSTMENTS
was unlucky enough to have included only a date and no reference to
another patent in the terminal disclaimer. To be sure, the USPTO faces a
practical problem in these cases because a terminal disclaimer that does not
refer to another patent gives the USPTO no indication of what the new
extended date of the patent should be. This problem can be overcome by
granting a URAA adjustment in these cases only to those who both petition
the USPTO and include in their petition evidence of a reference patent.
Such a practice would eliminate the arbitrary distinction based on the
language of the terminal disclaimer alone.
B. Patent Term Adjustment Due to USPTO Delay
The Patent Term Guarantee Act ensures that a patentee obtaining a
patent after the URAA's switch to a filing-based term will reap the benefits
of at least a seventeen-year patent term.160 A patentee may also be granted
a patent term adjustment based on specific types of delays arising during
the USPTO's processing of a patent application.16 1 The Patent Term
Guarantee Act has been positively regarded as a fair means of maintaining
appropriate incentives, while not unduly stifling competition. 162  This
system preserves incentives to innovate by providing a measure of
certainty to potential innovators. It is also responsive to fairness concerns,
as it promotes consistency in patent terms that might otherwise differ for
reasons beyond the patentees' control. Finally, the rules for calculating
patent adjustments implemented under this statute, including provisions
allowing for negative adjustments when delays are attributable to the
patentee, minimize the potential for gaming and inappropriate extensions
of the patent monopoly.
It has been pointed out that the Patent Guarantee Act's guarantee of a
seventeen-year term accomplishes little in the case of pharmaceutical
innovations.163 Due to the regulatory process and the Hatch-Waxman
Act's limits on term extensions,164 a pharmaceutical patent will rarely
160 This is accomplished by compensating a patent owner for pendency of an
application that lasts beyond three years (B-type delay). 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B) (2006).
161 Id. § 154(b)(1).
162 See, e.g., Steven Andersen, Presumed Invalid? Pending Bill Would Alter Patent
System, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1999, at 1, 34.
163 Mandy Wilson, Note, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection: More Generic Favored
Legislation May Cause Pioneer Drug Companies to Pull the Plug on Innovation, 90 KY.
L.J. 495, 512-13 (2002).
164 The Hatch-Waxman Act limits an extension to a maximum of fourteen years from
the date of first FDA approval. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3).
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reach a term of seventeen years. This criticism ignores the fact, however,
that the Patent Guarantee Act also provides for patent term adjustments in
addition to the three-year pendency adjustment that serves to guarantee a
seventeen-year term.165 Further, such adjustments can be added to any
Hatch-Waxman extension earned by a pharmaceutical patent.166 In any
case, this criticism is not a direct criticism of the Patent Term Guarantee
Act. The concern of insufficient patent terms for pharmaceutical patents is
best addressed by ensuring that the Hatch-Waxman system of extensions
intended specifically to compensate for regulatory delay is operating
adequately. 167
1. Availability of a USPTO Delay Adjustment for a Patent Previously
Adjusted Under the URAA
According to USPTO regulations, a patent previously adjusted under
the URAA transitional provisions may not take advantage of a patent term
adjustment for USPTO delay.168 Although at first glance this rule may be
easily understood in light of the impetus behind the Patent Term Guarantee
Act, a more in-depth analysis reveals that in fact a different rule would
preserve the policy considerations underlying the passage of both the
URAA and the Patent Term Guarantee Act. An entirely separate question,
however, is whether the current rule serves the ultimate goals of the patent
system. The current rule does appear to serve these goals. To understand
why, however, it is instructive to undertake a full analysis of the rule.
a. The Rule in Light of the Impetus Behind the Patent Term
Guarantee Act
The Patent Term Guarantee Act's provision for patent term
adjustments is a response to concerns that the switch to a new filing-date-
based term calculation under the URAA would result in significantly
shorter patent terms (compared to the fixed seventeen-year term previously
granted) for patents subject to extensive prosecution delays. 16 A main
goal of the adjustments is thus to ensure that a patentee receives a patent
term of at least seventeen years, consistent with the previous patent
165 See id. § 154(b)(1).
166 See id. § 156(a).
167 See generally Avery, supra note 58, for a discussion of the success of the Hatch-
Waxman Act and subsequent amendments.
168 See MPEP, supra note 29, § 2710.
169 Campbell, supra note 34, at 316-17.
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regime.170 A patent qualifying for the transitional term adjustment under
the URAA may already expect such a patent term because the patent is
entitled to the greater of a term of seventeen years from issue or twenty
years from filing; if one of these alternative term calculations provides for
a longer term, then the patent term is extended accordingly.' 7 ' To allow
the patentee to further extend the patent monopoly by taking advantage of
a USPTO delay adjustment would ostensibly result in an unfair application
of a law meant to benefit those unable to take advantage of a URAA
adjustment due to the timing of the relevant applications.
b. The Rule in Light ofPolicy Considerations Underlying the
URAA and the Patent Term Guarantee Act
Although making a patent term adjustment for USPTO delay
unavailable to a patent previously having benefitted from a URAA
adjustment aligns logically with the Patent Guarantee Act's goal of
guaranteeing each patentee a minimum patent term of seventeen years,
other policy considerations may justify granting these adjustments to all
patents, regardless of their URAA-adjustment status. To see why, consider
the following example of a hypothetical patent a issued prior to the URAA
adjustment cutoff date of June 8, 1995. The patent issued two years after
filing and was granted a term of seventeen years. After the URAA's
enactment, a's term was extended by an additional year because the
twenty-years-from-filing calculation provided a longer term for this patent.
For this hypothetical patent, however, one full year of the two-year
prosecution time was attributable to USPTO delay. If a qualified for an
adjustment due to USPTO delay (it does not under current law) the patent
term would be extended by an additional year, giving a a nineteen-year
total term.
This extra year may seem like an unwarranted extension of the patent
monopoly for patent a. But consider now a second patent, 1, issued after
the URAA cutoff, receiving a patent term of twenty years from filing
without the possibility of a URAA adjustment. Patent 0 was also issued
two years after prosecution, and like patent a, one year of this prosecution
170 Accordingly, one of the three main bases for an adjustment under these provisions is
pendency of the application for more than three years, regardless of the specific reason for
the delay (although the delay cannot be attributable to the putative patentee). See 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(b)(1)(B). However, the adjustments may result in a patent term that is longer than
seventeen years total because pendency beyond three years is not the only means of
calculating USPTO delay. See, e.g., id. § 154(b)(1)(A).
.. 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1).
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time was attributable to USPTO delay. Unlike patent a, however, patent f3
may take advantage of a USPTO delay adjustment and will be granted a
term of nineteen years, while a will only benefit from an eighteen-year
term. Given that each patent was subjected to a year of prosecution delays
beyond the patentees' control, considerations of fairness and consistency
would dictate that each should benefit from the same patent term. Further,
patent a does not unfairly extend the patent monopoly. Patent a will not
receive a longer term than a patent prosecuted under similar circumstances,
and the owner of patent a has not manipulated the system because the
adjustments received are entirely attributable to USPTO-initiated
prosecution delay.
Allowing an individual patent to benefit from both a URAA
adjustment and an adjustment for USPTO delay also makes sense in light
of the motivations behind the respective statutes providing for each of
these extensions. The URAA adjustment provisions were passed to ease
the transition between the two patent term regimes by ensuring that a
patent issued before the transition is not granted a shorter patent term than
a patent issued under the new regime. 172 Not allowing the earlier patent to
take advantage of an adjustment for USPTO delay often results in the exact
situation the URAA adjustments were designed to avoid,17 3 as seen in the
hypothetical. Similarly, the Patent Term Guarantee Act adjustment
provisions were passed to ensure that a patent issued after the URAA
transition is not granted a shorter patent term than a patent issued prior to
the passage of the URAA.1 74
In sum, the overall purpose and effect of the two statutes is to bring a
measure of consistency to patent terms, regardless of whether a patent was
issued before or after the change in patent terms effected by the URAA.
Because there is no clear relationship between date of issuance and social
merit of a patent, this result is fair to patentees. The current USPTO rule
172 See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (making the same
argument in the context of URAA adjustments and Hatch-Waxman extensions).
17 That is, a shorter patent term for a patent passed prior to the URAA transition to the
twenty-years-from-filing patent term.
174 See Campbell, supra note 34, at 316-17. The goal of the Patent Term Guarantee Act
was not to ensure that a patent issued after the URAA transition would be granted a longer
term than a pre-URAA patent. Further, another effect of the statute is that it brings
consistency to patent terms not only among patents issued prior to and after the URAA, but
also among individual patents issued post-URAA, because varying prosecution times can
create differing twenty-years-from-filing terms.
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that bars a patent issued prior to the URAA from taking advantage of an
adjustment for USPTO delay, however, undermines this result.
c. The Rule in Light of the Overarching Goals of the Patent
System
Allowing a URAA-adjusted patent to also take advantage of an
adjustment for USPTO delay would help achieve consistency in patent
terms, resulting in fair treatment to all patentees. However, fairness and
consistency are not necessarily the main goals of the patent system.
Instead, as discussed previously, the patent system is concerned with
maintaining the proper balance between incentives to innovate and public
access to technological innovation.175 The USPTO rule denying a USPTO
delay adjustment to a patent previously adjusted under the URAA is likely
correct in light of these broader policy considerations. The research and
development process underlying all URAA-adjusted patents has already
occurred, and thus term extensions are unnecessary to spur this innovation.
Moreover, the owners of these patents expected no such extensions when
they undertook the development process. To further reward the owners of
these patents at the expense of delayed public access would result in a
windfall to patent owners and deadweight loss to society.
This is not to say that fairness and consistency do not have a place in
the patent system's balancing act, however. A patent system that offers
fair and consistent rewards to innovators encourages future innovation by
boosting potential innovators' confidence in the system and by providing
past innovators with positive experiences such that they will be
incentivized to innovate again. In this case-particularly since the rule has
been in effect without observable detriment for twelve years, and because
patents theoretically eligible for both adjustments concurrently are
gradually expiring and leaving the patent system i-considerations of
fairness and consistency are insufficient to justify a change to a rule that
promotes the goals of the patent system by denying overcompensation to
patent holders.
175 See Beard et al., supra note 1, at 240.
176 See supra note 146 and accompanying text discussing the number of such patents
currently in force.
2013] 479
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
2. Availability of a USPTO Delay Adjustment for a Terminally
Disclaimed Patent
When a patent is obtained on the condition that it is terminally
disclaimed to a reference patent to avoid an obviousness-type double
patenting problem, the terminally disclaimed patent may not obtain a term
adjustment for USPTO delay.' 7 7  This rule, implemented via USPTO
regulations, arises from the Patent Term Guarantee Act-codified at
§ 154(b)(2)(B)-which states: "No patent the term of which has been
disclaimed beyond a specified date may be adjusted under this section
beyond the expiration date specified in the disclaimer."' 78 The Federal
Circuit in Hi-Tech confirmed that this section "expressly excludes" a
terminally disclaimed patent from the benefit of a USPTO delay
adjustment.17 9
This rule is consistent with the role of the terminal disclaimer in
preventing an unwarranted extension of the patent monopoly. Because a
terminal disclaimer is a device used by a patentee to overcome an
obviousness-type double patenting rejection, the terminally disclaimed
patent covers only an obvious iteration of the invention disclosed in the
patent to which it is terminally disclaimed. 80 The terminal disclaimer
prevents the patentee from unfairly extending the monopoly of the
reference invention by ensuring that the second patent, which also covers
this invention (with obvious changes or improvements), does not extend in
time beyond the expiration of the reference patent.' 8' If a patentee were
allowed to extend the duration of the second patent beyond the date of
terminal disclaimer by claiming an adjustment for USPTO delay, the role
of the terminal disclaimer in preventing unjustified extensions of the patent
monopoly would be undermined.
Although allowing a terminally disclaimed patent to take advantage of
an adjustment for USPTO delay would result in extending the monopoly of
the initial invention, it is true that such an adjustment is only granted in the
case of prosecution delay attributable to the USPTO.182  Therefore,
opportunities for patentees to manipulate the system to achieve
unwarranted extensions of patent rights are minimized. Further, although
"' 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(B) (2006).
' Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., 482 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
18o Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
"' See id.
182 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2).
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the claims in a terminally disclaimed patent may be obvious in light of a
reference patent, they are still different from the claims in the reference
patent. For example, the disclaimed patent might include broader claims
or various improvements to the reference invention. One reason to apply
for such a patent, although it must be terminally disclaimed, is to acquire
protection over these variations for the remaining term of the reference
patent. 8 3 If a terminally disclaimed patent suffers long prosecution times,
that term is inevitably shortened, since the patent must expire on the same
date as the reference patent. This also provides a reason to allow the
terminally disclaimed patent to extend beyond the expiration of the
reference patent.
These arguments are unconvincing, however. Although patentee
opportunities to manipulate the system are minimized in this case, allowing
the owner of a terminally disclaimed patent to take advantage of an
adjustment for USPTO delay would result in an unwarranted extension of
patent rights over the reference invention, regardless of whether the patent
owner orchestrated this extension. The extension would be unwarranted
because a delay in prosecution of the disclaimed patent is irrelevant to the
duration of the reference patent and should not be used to effectively
extend the term of the reference patent. Although a patentee may indeed
suffer from a truncated period of protection over the broader claims or
improvements claimed in the disclaimed patent, such claims are not
independently patentable. The potential harm in granting a patentee an
extended monopoly over a reference invention is greater than that arising
from truncating the rights over claims that could not exist independently of
that invention. Therefore, the rule preventing a terminally disclaimed
patent from benefitting from a USPTO delay adjustment helps maintain the
appropriate balance between incentives and access.
a. If a Reference Patent Has Received an Adjustment for USPTO
Delay
An exception to this rule exists if the reference patent itself receives an
adjustment for USPTO delay.' 84 In this case, the terminally disclaimed
patent may receive an independent adjustment extending the expiration of
the terminally disclaimed patent up to, but not exceeding, the expiration
date of the reference patent.185
183 See Hinkens, supra note 8, at 389-90.
184 See id. at 381-82.
185 See id.
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This exception represents the current approach of the USPTO in
relevant cases.'16 Such a case has not been litigated before the Federal
Circuit; however, it is worthwhile to inquire whether such an approach fits
the overall policy goals of the U.S. patent system. Although the exception
is potentially confusing to patent holders and their competitors, it does
nevertheless strike an appropriate balance between relevant policy
considerations. This can be seen most clearly by comparing the outcomes
of alternative approaches to the outcomes of the approach currently
adopted by the USPTO.
i. Approach (i): Eliminate the Cap on Adjustment for the
Disclaimed Patent
One possible alternative to the current approach of the USPTO is to
eliminate the-reference-based cap on adjustment for the disclaimed patent.
In other words, a patentee could claim whatever adjustment was due under
the USPTO delay calculations for the terminally disclaimed patent
regardless of the adjusted expiration of the reference patent. As an
example of this approach, consider patent 0, which has been terminally
disclaimed to patent a, such that a and P expire on date D. Patent a
qualifies for and receives an adjustment based on USPTO delays during
prosecution that total a year; thus, a has a new adjusted expiration date of
D + 1. Patent P qualifies for an adjustment based on USPTO delays during
prosecution that total two years. Under this approach, once a has received
an adjustment, 0 could take advantage of the entire two years of delay-
based adjustment, such that P would now expire on date D + 2, one year
later than a.
This approach would be advantageous to an owner of a terminally
disclaimed patent because the term for the claims in the disclaimed patent
would not be truncated by prosecution delays that were beyond the
owner's control. This approach is unacceptable from a policy perspective,
however, because it implicates the same concerns that the general rule
forbidding a USPTO delay adjustment to a terminally disclaimed patent
addresses.187  Namely, such a position would allow a patentee to
effectively and inappropriately extend the monopoly over the reference
patent based on delays in the prosecution of the disclaimed patent that are
"8 Although the USPTO advises patentees as to the term of enforceability of their
patents, it does not make final decisions determining the durations of patents. Id. at 381
n.22.
'
8 7 See Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
482 [41:445
PATENT TERM ADJUSTMENTS
irrelevant to the reference patent. 1 Any detriment a patentee might suffer
by not reaping the full adjustment period for the obvious improvements or
modifications to the reference invention is outweighed by the harm caused
by the unwarranted extension of monopoly rights.
ii. Approach (ii): Eliminate All USPTO Delay Adjustments for
a Disclaimed Patent
A second possible approach is to disallow all USPTO delay
adjustments for a terminally disclaimed patent, regardless of whether any
such adjustments were granted to the reference patent. Consider once
again patent a, to which patent 0 has been terminally disclaimed such that
both patents expire on date D. Patent a qualifies for a one-year adjustment
due to qualifying USPTO delays, so a's expiration date is thus adjusted to
D + 1. Patent P qualifies for a two-year adjustment due to USPTO delays;
however, under the rule contemplated here, P would receive no, adjustment
and would expire on date D, one year earlier than patent a.
This approach, unlike approach (i), would certainly prevent any
inappropriate extension of the patent monopoly. It too is suboptimal,
however, because it goes too far in the opposite direction, withholding
patent protection from a patent owner when there is no compelling policy
rationale for doing so. As discussed previously, the reason patent 0 is
terminally disclaimed to a, a commonly owned patent, is to prevent the
patent owner from using P to extend the monopoly over the invention
claimed in a.189 As long as P expires concurrently with a, this goal is
achieved. To maintain the expiration date of P at date D when a now
expires a full year later, and when the patentee has suffered delays in
prosecuting 1 caused by the USPTO, unnecessarily truncates the patentee's
exclusivity rights over the inventions claimed in patent P.
iii. Approach (iii): Adjust the Disclaimed Patent Concurrent
with the Reference Patent
A third approach is to automatically adjust the expiration of the
terminally disclaimed patent to correspond to the new adjusted expiration
of the reference patent. Consider patents a and 0, which are linked by a
terminal disclaimer and expire on date D. Once again, a qualifies for an
adjustment shifting its expiration to D + 1. This time, however, patent P
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Nevertheless, P's expiration date would automatically adjust to be
concurrent with a's adjustment such that it would also expire on date
D + 1. Alternatively, patent P may have suffered prosecution delays that
would theoretically entitle it to a two-year adjustment, but under this
approach, P would only receive a one year extension and would be
adjusted to a new expiration date of D + 1.
This approach carries with it the advantages of clarity and certainty for
a patent owner and its competitors. The simple rule dictates that the
disclaimed patent and reference patent expire on the same date, regardless
of any USPTO delay adjustments claimed by the reference patent. This
provision of clarity is particularly important in cases where the terminally
disclaimed patent is disclaimed to the "full statutory term" of the reference
patent and does not mention a specific expiration date.190 Further, this
approach satisfies the purpose of the terminal disclaimer because the
terminally disclaimed patent will never expire after the reference patent. 191
A similarly simple rule for terminally disclaimed patents was adopted for
URAA adjustments: a terminally disclaimed patent automatically benefits
from any URAA adjustment granted to the reference patent.192
Despite these advantages over the other approaches, this approach still
does not represent the best approach because it grants patent owners an
unwarranted extension of patent rights. With this approach, however, the
concern is not the classic concern of extending the monopoly over the
reference invention that the terminal disclaimer is meant to address, but the
concern is instead of inappropriately extending the monopoly over the
claims in the terminally disclaimed patent that differ from the reference
invention. This extension might occur because, as in the hypothetical
presented, there are delays in the prosecution of patent a that justify an
expiration adjustment for that patent, but there are no (or fewer) delays for
the terminally disclaimed patent, P. If P is allowed to take advantage of
a's adjustment, then the monopoly over the broader or additional claims of
patent P is extended for reasons unrelated to P's prosecution. Patent P has
already benefitted from the full patent term to which it is entitled, and to
190 Under current law, a terminal disclaimer must follow this format if the patentee
wishes to take advantage of a URAA extension for the terminally disclaimed patent. See
MPEP, supra note 29, § 2701.
191 This statement assumes that the disclaimed patent does not qualify for another
extension, such as a Hatch-Waxman extension.
192 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (2006). This is the case unless the terminal disclaimer did not
mention the "full statutory term" of the initial patent. See MPEP, supra note 29, § 2701.
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grant it a term extension based on the prosecution history of patent a
would be inappropriate.
iv. Approach (iv): Adjust the Disclaimed Patent up to, but Not
Exceeding, Any Adjustments to the Reference Patent
Presented finally is the approach currently adopted by the USPTO
when a reference patent tied to a terminally disclaimed patent has been
granted an adjustment for USPTO delay. Under this rule, patent 0,
terminally disclaimed to patent a and expiring on date D, may claim only
those adjustments for which it independently qualifies, up to but not
exceeding the adjustments claimed by patent a.193  For example, if a
qualifies for a one-year adjustment due to prosecution delays such that its
expiration is shifted to D + 1, and P only independently qualifies for a six-
month adjustment due to prosecution delays, then O's expiration date
would be shifted from D to D + 0.5. Conversely, even if p independently
qualifies for a two-year adjustment due to prosecution delays, P's
expiration date would shift only to D + 1 because a's expiration date
places a cap on the term of P.
This is the best approach because the requirement that patent f
independently qualify for any prosecution delay adjustments prevents the
unwarranted extension of monopoly right over the contents of patent P.
Similarly, placing a cap on the latest expiration date of 0 based on the
adjusted expiration of a prevents the unwarranted extension of monopoly
rights over the contents of patent a. The disadvantage to this approach is
that it uncouples the expiration dates of a terminally disclaimed patent and
its reference patent, which may confuse patent owners and their
competitors about the duration of patent rights. Such confusion could lead
to inefficient decision making and expensive litigation. This potential
confusion may be a necessary price to pay, however, to achieve the
benefits of finely calibrated patent rights that are not inappropriately
extended or truncated.
C The Hatch- Waxman Act
1. Generally
The Hatch-Waxman Act provisions offering patent term extensions to
pharmaceutical manufacturers 94 as a compromise in exchange for
193 See Hinkens, supra note 8, at 389-90.
194 Hatch-Waxman extensions are also available for patents covering medical devices,
certain food products, and other inventions requiring FDA regulatory review prior to
(continued)
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statutory reforms allowing generic manufacturers to enter the market more
quickly and efficiently have been generally viewed as a positive
development in the law. 95 A new pharmaceutical product must undergo
lengthy regulatory review before being approved for marketing, and the
period of review often substantially cuts into the term of patent
protection.196 This is particularly true because post-URAA patent terms
are measured from the date of filing rather than from the date of issue.
Truncating patent terms raises the concern that pharmaceutical innovators
may not be sufficiently incented to research and develop new products.1 9 7
This concern is particularly salient in the drug industry because of the
possibility that the most innovative and socially valuable drugs are also
those that require the lengthiest periods of clinical testing and regulatory
review.1 98 The relevant Hatch-Waxman Act provisions allow a patent
owner to recover some of this time by extending the duration of the patent
based on regulatory review times for the patented invention.1 These
provisions preserve incentives to innovate in a socially valuable industry.
Further, provisions providing maximum caps on extensionS200 and
requiring merely that generic manufacturers secure regulatory approval to
sell patented drug equivalents counterbalance research incentives by
ensuring that public access to these innovations is not unduly curtailed.
Finally, limiting the availability of extensions by other means201 reduces
marketing. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-
Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
195 See, e.g., Thomas Chen, Note, Authorized Generics: A Prescription for Hatch-
Waxman Reform, 93 VA. L. REv. 459, 464 (2007); Lechner-Fish, supra note 70, at 383.
196 See Avery, supra note 58, at 172 n.10.
19 See Roin, supra note 60, at 508.
"9 See id. at 509-13.
199 The exact period of extension is calculated as the duration of the NDA regulatory
review period, plus one-half of the duration of any IND regulatory review period. 35
U.S.C. § 156(c) (2006).
200 For most patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides for a maximum five-year
extension. Id. § 156(g)(6)(A). The total patent term cannot extend more than fourteen
years past the date of regulatory approval. Id. § 156(c)(3). For patents issued (and for
which regulatory testing of the patented product had begun) prior to the enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, the Act provides for a maximum extension of only two years, because
incentives are not required; the development process had already begun. Id. § 156(g)(6)(C).
See also Lechner-Fish, supra note 70, at 392.
201 These other limitations include the limitations of one extension per patent and one
extension per regulatory review period. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(a)(2), (c)(4).
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opportunities for gaming by the pharmaceutical industry202 and reduces the
likelihood of granting an extension in a case where the extension does not
* 203incentivize innovation.
Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act extensions serve the goals of the patent
system by maintaining the appropriate balance between incentives and
access. The picture becomes more complicated, however, when other
opportunities for extensions and adjustments are layered onto the Hatch-
Waxman Act provisions.
2. URAA
Two basic rules govern the interaction between a URAA adjustments
and a Hatch-Waxman extension. These rules were delineated by the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Merck & Co. v. Kessler, where the
Federal Circuit confronted two different situations involving the URAA
and the Hatch-Waxman Act.204
a. Availability of a Hatch- Waxman Extension and a URAA
Adjustment for a Patent Not Yet Expired on June 8, 1995
i. The Federal Circuit's Holding in Kessler
The first situation involved a group of patents issued prior to June 8,
1995, that each qualified for URAA adjustments because the twenty-years-
from-filing term would have resulted in a later expiration date than the
previous seventeen-years-from-issuance term.2 05 These patents had also
previously qualified for Hatch-Waxman extensions based on regulatory
delays, but the extension period had not yet begun; thus, the original
seventeen-year term of these patents had not yet expired.206 When the
URAA went into effect, the owner of these patents asked the FDA to
republish the patents with expiration dates consistent with the new twenty-
years-from-filing term, while maintaining the previously granted Hatch-
202 Gaming by the pharmaceutical industry has been a problem with respect to other
aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Act not discussed in detail here. The 2003 Hatch-Waxman
Act amendments were meant to address these and other abuses. For a discussion about the
success of these amendments, see Avery, supra note 58, at 188-95.
203 Some have argued that these limitations, including the fourteen-year extension
limitation, go too far. E.g., Wilson, supra note 163, at 510.
204 Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
205 Id. at 1550.
206 See id.
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Waxman extensions. 207 Following the reasoning of the USPTO, the FDA
refused to do so. 2 08 The USPTO took the position that under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, a patentee with a Hatch-Waxman extension could only be
granted the greater of the original seventeen-years-from-issue term plus the
relevant extension, or the new twenty-years-from-filing term without any
Hatch-Waxman extension.2 09 The patentee could not take advantage of
both the new twenty-year term and the Hatch-Waxman extension
concurrently. This position was based on language in the Hatch-Waxman
Act, which states that a Hatch-Waxman extension should be calculated
"from the original expiration date."210
The Federal Circuit disagreed with that position, and held that a
patentee can take advantage of both a URAA adjustment and a Hatch-
Waxman extension.2 1' The court looked to the legislative history of the
Hatch-Waxman Act and concluded that Congress included the language
requiring the extension to be added to the "original" expiration date to
prevent a single patent from receiving more than one Hatch-Waxman
extension, not to prevent granting an extension to a patent that had
benefitted from another type of extension.212 The court also took note of
the district court's argument that the policy goal of the URAA transitional
provisions was to establish consistency in patent terms among patents
issued before the term change and those issued after the term change.213
Under the USPTO's reading of the statute, a patent granted after the
URAA cutoff date that also qualifies for a Hatch-Waxman extension could
take advantage of both a twenty-year term and a Hatch-Waxman
extension; a patent granted before the cutoff date could not.214 The court
found that this result would conflict with the policy underlying the grant of
URAA adjustments.2 15
207 The FDA is required to publish expiration dates of patents granted extensions under
the Hatch-Waxman Act to help facilitate the communication of relevant information
between patent owners and their generic competitors. Id. at 1547.
208 Id. at 1548.
209 id
210 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit also stressed this
particular language of the Hatch-Waxman Act. See Kessler, 80 F.3d at 1548.
211 Kessler, 80 F.3d at 1550-52.
212Id. at 1550-51.
213 1d. at 1549.





The Federal Circuit's reasoning in Kessler illustrates the difficulty of
weighing statutory construction and policy considerations when two
statutes enacted for different purposes interact in unexpected ways. In
spite of this difficulty, the court's first holding-that a patent issued prior
to the URAA cutoff with an original term not yet expired on that date may
take advantage of both a URAA adjustment and a Hatch-Waxman
extension-advances the patent system by promoting goals of both the
URAA and the Hatch-Waxman Act, and is fair to both patent holders and
their competitors. On the one hand, the URAA adjustment provisions aim
to promote term consistency among patents issued both before and after
the URAA cutoff date.216 As the Federal Circuit noted in Kessler, to deny
such an adjustment to a patent issued prior to the cutoff date solely because
it had been granted a Hatch-Waxman extension would undermine this
consistency because a patent issued after the cutoff date may benefit from
both a twenty-year term and any Hatch-Waxman extension for which it
qualifies. 2 17 On the other hand, the Hatch-Waxman extension provisions
aim to provide research and development incentives to pioneer
pharmaceutical companies and to deliver a quid pro quo to such firms in
return for eased generic market entry.218  Denying a Hatch-Waxman
extension to a patent taking advantage of a URAA adjustment would
undermine not only the URAA's goal of patent term consistency, but also
the incentives offered by the Hatch-Waxman Act, solely because a patent
was issued prior to June 8, 1995. Although it could be argued that a
Hatch-Waxman extension is unnecessary for such a patent because the
product at issue has already been developed, this argument is inapposite in
this situation. Unlike the case where a patentee would have developed the
invention notwithstanding an incentive,19 for these patents, the inventions
at issue were developed with the expectation that such incentives would be
available. 2 20 Removing such incentives after the fact because of a change
216 See id at 1549.
217 See id. at 1551.
218 See Lechner-Fish, supra note 70, at 389-91.
219 An example discussed in this Article is that of a URAA-adjusted patent seeking an
adjustment for USPTO delay. See supra Part III.B. 1.c.
220 The difference here between a URAA-adjusted patent seeking a Hatch-Waxman
extension and one seeking an adjustment for USPTO delay is the relative timing of the
statutes at issue. The Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984, eleven years prior to the
URAA, while the Patent Term Guarantee Act was passed in 2000, five years after the
(continued)
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in patent term beyond the patentee's control-i.e., the enactment of the
URAA-would be unfair and would undermine confidence in the system
of incentives provided by the Patent and Hatch-Waxman Acts.
b. Availability ofa Hatch- Waxman Extension and a URAA
Adjustment for a Patent in Force on June 8, 1995, Solely Due
to a Hatch- Waxman Extension
i. The Federal Circuit's Holding in Kessler
A somewhat different situation led the court in Kessler to limit the
general rule allowing a patent to benefit from a URAA adjustment and a
Hatch-Waxman extension concurrently.2 21 Some of the patents at issue in
Kessler were in force as of the URAA cutoff only because of a previously
222
granted Hatch-Waxman extension. For example, one patent in force on
June 8, 1995, had already expended seventeen months of its two-year
Hatch-Waxman extension.223 The patentee argued that the full two-year
Hatch-Waxman extension should be added to the new twenty-years-from-
filing term granted under the URAA.224
The Federal Circuit did not find improper the USPTO's practice of
granting URAA adjustments to patents in force on June 8, 1995, solely
225 cordibecause of previously granted Hatch-Waxman extensions. The court did
find, however, that for such a patent, a Hatch-Waxman extension could not
be added to the URAA-adjusted patent term.22 6 The court reasoned that
granting both a URAA adjustment and a Hatch-Waxman extension in such
a case could only occur in one of two ways: either the full term of the
Hatch-Waxman extension could be added onto the URAA-adjusted term,
as the patentees requested, or the Hatch-Waxman extension could be
"split," for example, by adding six months to the URAA-adjusted term for
a patent that had already expended seventeen months of its two-year
227Hatch-Waxman extension.227 The court found that the first method would
URAA. Thus, many URAA-adjusted patents were developed with the expectation of a
Hatch-Waxman extension, while there was no expectation for an adjustment for USPTO
delay.
221 Kessler, 80 F.3d at 1552-53.
222 Id. at 1552.
223 id.
224 See id.
225 The court did not explicitly consider this question. See id.
22 6 Id. at 1552-53.
227 See id. at 1552.
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violate the Hatch-Waxman Act because it would result in a Hatch-
Waxman extension greater than two years, a result explicitly forbidden by
the Act for the patents at issue.22 8 As for the second method, the court
noted that the patentees had not asked for such a remedy, and furthermore,
that the Hatch-Waxman Act did not provide for such a "splitting" of
extensions.22 9
Thus, because neither method of adding a Hatch-Waxman extension
complied with the Act, the court found such an addition impermissible.23 0
The court found that although consistency was indeed a goal of the URAA,
it did not justify violating the explicit two-year statutory limitation on
Hatch-Waxman extensions for these patents, as Congress "struck the
balance it wished between [Hatch-Waxman] extensions and [the] early
availability of generics." 23 1
ii. Policy Implications
A proper analysis of the Federal Circuit's second holding in Kessler is
more complicated than the first. Although the court correctly found that a
Hatch-Waxman extension should not be added in its entirety to a URAA-
adjusted patent in this circumstance, the court's opinion lacked a proper
explanation. The court failed to reveal why a patent in this category
should be granted a URAA adjustment in the first place, and why, if a
patent is granted such an adjustment, it must lose any unexpended but
earned Hatch-Waxman extension. Examining these questions reveals that
denying a URAA adjustment, but allowing a full Hatch-Waxman extension
best serves the goals of the patent system. However, a further examination
reveals that these two incorrect rules interact to achieve basically the same
effect on a patent's term as would be achieved if both rules were corrected
to conform to a more comprehensive policy analysis. Because of this, a
change to these rules is unnecessary, as it would create costs without
producing measurable benefits.
First, the Federal Circuit was correct to hold that a Hatch-Waxman
extension should not be added in its entirety to a URAA-adjusted patent
when the patent benefitted from the URAA adjustment solely because of a
partially expended Hatch-Waxman extension. Allowing such a practice
228 The Hatch-Waxman Act caps the maximum possible extension under its provisions
at two years for patents issued prior to the passage of the Act. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(C).
The two-year maximum applied to the patents at issue in Kessler. Id at 1553.
22 9 Id. at 1552.
230 Id. at 1553.
231 id
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would grant a patent a longer Hatch-Waxman extension than it had
"earned" due to regulatory delay. For example, if a patent had been
granted a two-year Hatch-Waxman extension but had already expended
seventeen months of this extension at the time of URAA adjustment,
adding two full years to the new twenty-years-from-filing term would
result in a total Hatch-Waxman extension of over three years for a patent
that had only undergone two years of regulatory delay.232 Such an
expansion of Hatch-Waxman rights for these patents would unnecessarily
extend the monopoly of patentees because this additional incentive was
neither anticipated by the patentee nor required to spur the innovation of
the patented product. Further, the expansion serves no other obvious
purpose, such as promoting consistency among patent terms. 23 3
Although the Federal Circuit was correct in this first finding, two
issues remain related to the category of patents in force on July 8, 1995,
solely because of a Hatch-Waxman extension. The first is whether a
URAA adjustment is justified for a patent in this category. The Federal
Circuit did not address this issue in Kessler;234 however, the answer is
likely no. Granting a URAA adjustment to a patent in force at the time of
transition only because of a Hatch-Waxman extension effectuates an
unnecessary expansion of the patent monopoly. The URAA-based policy
consideration of consistency is not so strongly implicated for such a patent,
because but for the Hatch-Waxman extension, the patent would have
already expired prior to the transition to the twenty-year term. With any
Hatch-Waxman extension, such a patent will expire soon after the URAA's
cutoff date.235
The second issue is whether a patent in force at the time of transition
only because of a Hatch-Waxman extension should nevertheless have these
rights truncated due to the intervening URAA adjustment: This result
232 The total Hatch-Waxman extension in this case would be seventeen months plus
twenty-four months, or forty-one months. Id. at 1552.
233 In fact, this practice would have the opposite result, as a patent in force at the time of
URAA adjustment solely because of a partially expended Hatch-Waxman extension would
be able to take advantage of an "extra" Hatch-Waxman extension not available to other
patents. The goal of consistency would thus be undermined.
234 See id. (noting only that the patents received a term adjustment under the URAA).
235 Consistency is much more strongly implicated, on the other hand, for a patent issued
on June 7, 1995, one day before the URAA's transition to a twenty-years-from-filing term.
Without the benefit of a URAA adjustment, such a patent would expire seventeen years




occurs because under Kessler, a patent in this category may not "split" an
earned Hatch-Waxman extension.236 Such splitting would allow any
portion of a Hatch-Waxman extension not expended prior to the URAA
adjustment to be added to the new twenty-years-from-filing term. The
Federal Circuit correctly noted that the patentees in Kessler did not ask for
such splitting, and therefore did not evaluate this issue further.23 7 Thus, the
patentee loses any period of Hatch-Waxman extension unexpended at the
time of URAA adjustment. However, this too appears to be an incorrect
result when viewed from a policy perspective. Just as the court found in
the first holding of Kessler that it would be unwise policy to deprive a
patent of the benefit of an earned Hatch-Waxman extension in its
238entirety,28 it is also unwise to partially deprive a patent of such an earned
extension.
It appears, therefore, that a patent in force on June 8, 1995, because of
a Hatch-Waxman extension should be able to realize the full Hatch-
Waxman extension to which it is entitled without having such rights
effectively truncated by an intervening URAA adjustment. On the
contrary, such a patent likely should not benefit from a URAA adjustment
at all. In practice, these two inappropriate rules together tend to achieve
the same result that would be achieved if both rules were corrected. This
occurs because, for an individual patent, the greater the portion of a Hatch-
Waxman extension that has been expended at the time of URAA
adjustment, the shorter that adjustment will necessarily be.
An example best illustrates this principle. Take patent a, which issued
one year after filing on December 8, 1976, and has been granted a two-year
Hatch-Waxman extension. On June 8, 1995, the date of URAA
adjustment, a's original seventeen-year term has expired, and a has
expended eighteen months of its Hatch-Waxman extension.23 9 Under
current law, a receives a URAA term adjustment but loses any unexpended
240Hatch-Waxman extension. Since a was filed on December 8, 1975, the
236 See id.
237 See id.
238 See id. at 1550-52.
239 The maximum available Hatch-Waxman extension for a patent in the category
considered here is two years. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides for a two-year maximum
extension for patents issued prior to the passing of the Act in 1984. 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(g)(6)(C) (2006). Patents in force solely due to a Hatch-Watchman extension on June
8, 1995, issued at least seventeen years prior to this date (1978 or earlier), and thus a Hatch-
Waxman extension for such a patent is capped at two years.
240 Kessler, 80 F.3d at 1552-53.
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new expiration under the URAA will be December 8, 1995, twenty years
from filing.
Now consider what would occur if, in accordance with the policy
analysis, patent a keeps its full Hatch-Waxman extension but is denied a
URAA adjustment. On June 8, 1995, a would not receive a URAA term
adjustment but would have six months of Hatch-Waxman extension
remaining. Again, a would expire on December 8, 1995.
Although the numbers do not work out to provide an identical
expiration date in every case, the general principle illustrated by this
example remains consistent. If a greater portion of the maximum two-year
Hatch-Waxman extension has been expended at the time of URAA
adjustment, the URAA adjustment will necessarily be shorter because
more time has passed since the filing of the patent. Conversely, if a
smaller portion of a Hatch-Waxman extension has been expended at the
time of the URAA effective date, the patent will be entitled to a longer
URAA adjustment simply because less time has passed since filing,
making the twenty-years-from-filing date further in the future. Thus,
although a URAA adjustment may not be justified for a patent in this
category, any adjustment it does receive will roughly balance out the
portion of the Hatch-Waxman extension that is inappropriately eliminated
by the Federal Circuit's holding in Kessler.
3. Availability of a Hatch- Waxman Extension for a Terminally
Disclaimed Patent
a. Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. and King
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
A terminal disclaimer does not affect a patentee's ability to obtain a
Hatch-Waxman extension of up to five years. 24 ' The Federal Circuit
announced this rule in Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. 24 2 In Hi-
Tech, the patent at issue had been terminally disclaimed to a reference
patent to avoid a finding of obviousness-type double patenting; both
patents thus expired on the same date.243 This expiration date had already
been adjusted once under the URAA. 244 The patent holder, Merck, sought
241 35 U.S.C. § 156(a); Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharm. Co., 482 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); King Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613-14
(D.N.J. 2006).
242 482 F.3d at 1322.




an additional extension of the terminally disclaimed patent under the
Hatch-Waxman Act based on the regulatory review of the terminally
disclaimed drug (but not based on the reference drug).245 Granting such an
extension effectively uncoupled the terminally disclaimed patent from the
reference patent by extending the terminally disclaimed patent's expiration
date beyond that of the reference patent. Hi-Tech, a manufacturer wishing
to market a generic version of the patented drug, argued that Merck no
longer had a valid patent because such an extension was impermissible. 246
The Federal Circuit found that the extension was allowable despite the fact
that the disclaimed patent and the reference patent would now expire on
different dates.247 The court, following reasoning similar to that employed
by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in a
comparable case, examined the relevant section of the Hatch-Waxman Act:
"'The term of a patent ... shall be extended" if certain conditions are
met,248 and explained that the word "shall" in the statutory provision
"denotes the imperative." 2 49 Therefore, according to the Federal Circuit, if
the conditions for obtaining a Hatch-Waxman extension (which do not
include the absence of a terminal disclaimer) are met, then the USPTO
must grant the extension.250 USPTO regulations and practice also reflect
this reasoning.2 5'
The Federal Circuit in Hi-Tech also looked to the statutory provisions
governing USPTO delay adjustments to support its holding.25 2 Section
154(b)(2)(B) states that "[n]o patent the term of which has been disclaimed
beyond a specified date may be adjusted under this section beyond the
expiration date specified in the disclaimer." 25 3  The court in Hi-Tech
explained that this section "expressly excludes patents in which a terminal
disclaimer was filed from the benefit of a term adjustment for PTO
245 d
246 Id. at 1319-20.
247 Id. at 1321-23.
248 Id. at 1320-22 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2006)) (emphasis added by the court).
249 Id. at 1322.
250 id.
251 37 C.F.R. § 1.775 states that if a patent is eligible for extension, that extension "will
run from the original expiration date of the patent or any earlier date set by terminal
disclaimer." 37 C.F.R. § 1.775(a) (2012). The MPEP states: "A patent may be extended
under 35 U.S.C. [§] 156 even though it has been terminally disclaimed." MPEP, supra note
29, § 2751.
252 Hi-Tech, 482 F.3d at 1322.
253 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(B).
2013]1 495
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
delays," and used this explicit prohibition as evidence that a Hatch-
Waxman extension is not prohibited for a terminally disclaimed patent
because no similar statutory prohibition exists in 35 U.S.C. § 156(a).254
Although the holdings in Hi-Tech and King are based chiefly on
statutory interpretation, each court briefly addressed the policy arguments
of the parties. In response to Hi-Tech's argument that granting a Hatch-
Waxman extension to a terminally disclaimed patent "would be contrary to
the purpose behind the use of terminal disclaimers because it would
effectively uncouple the terminal disclaimer from the original expiration
date" of the reference patent,255 the Federal Circuit responded that "[t]he
purpose of the terminal disclaimer-to prevent extension of patent term for
subject matter that would have been obvious over an earlier filed patent-
remains fulfilled by virtue of the fact that the date from which any Hatch-
Waxman extension is computed is the terminally disclaimed date." 256 In
King, the court took a slightly different approach in handling the policy
concerns of double patenting and the inappropriate extension of the patent
monopoly. 257 The court in King answered these concerns by pointing out
that Congress had extended terminally disclaimed patents before; in
particular, it had done so in connection with URAA adjustments, allowing
a terminally disclaimed patent to claim the same term extension granted to
the reference patent.258
Neither the Federal Circuit's arguments nor the District Court of New
Jersey's arguments in this regard adequately addressed the concern of
inappropriately extending patent monopolies via double patenting, a
concern raised by the defendants in each case. First, the Federal Circuit
reasoned that any double patenting concerns are resolved by the fact that
the extension is calculated only from the date of terminal disclaimer.2 59
This logic fails to acknowledge that the terminally disclaimed patent with
the Hatch-Waxman extension will extend in time beyond the expiration of
the patent to which it is terminally disclaimed. The outcome, like that
which would occur if a terminally disclaimed patent were able to benefit
254 Hi-Tech, 482 F.3d at 1322.
255 Id. at 1321.
256 d. at 1323.
257 King Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 609, 617-18 (D.N.J.
2006).
258 id.
259 Hi-Tech, 482 F.3d at 1322-23.
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from an adjustment for USPTO delay, 260 expands the patent monopoly
rights over the inventions claimed in the reference patent for a purpose
unrelated to the reference patent. In this case, the rights are expanded for
the purpose of regulatory delay in the approval of the terminally
disclaimed patent. Although this period of expansion is shortened because
the extension is calculated from the date of terminal disclaimer, it is not
eliminated. Thus, absent some clear justifying policy rationale, the
expansion is inappropriate under the principles of double patenting.
Second, the District Court of New Jersey's observation that Congress
previously extended terminally disclaimed patents in connection with the
URAA adjustment provisions does nothing to address the double patenting
concern, because in the case of a JRAA adjustment, a terminally
disclaimed patent extends concurrently with the reference patent. Unlike a
patent with a Hatch-Waxman extension, the terminally disclaimed patent
does not extend in time beyond that of the reference patent, and thus no
double patenting concerns are implicated.
b. Policy Implications
The Federal Circuit was likely correct in finding that the relevant
statutory provisions unambiguously direct that a terminally disclaimed
patent may take advantage of a Hatch-Waxman extension due to regulatory
delay but not a term adjustment due to USPTO prosecution delay.2 61
However, both the Federal Circuit's and the District Court of New Jersey's
inadequate responses to the policy arguments of the generic manufacturers
in each case prompt an inquiry into whether such a distinction is justified.
Although the Federal Circuit's reasoning does not explicitly provide an
answer, the distinction is likely justified. In each situation, granting an
extension to a terminally disclaimed patent based on a consideration
unrelated to the issuance of the reference patent, such that the terminally
disclaimed patent is uncoupled from, and extends beyond, the term of the
reference patent, raises a double patenting concern. Because the terminally
disclaimed patent covers basically the same invention as the reference
patent (with obvious modifications or additions), the monopoly over the
reference invention is effectively extended absent justification due to a
260 See supra Part III.B.2 for a more thorough discussion of the double patenting
concerns that arise when a terminally disclaimed patent is granted an extension that is
independent of the patent to which it is disclaimed.
261 See Hi-Tech, 482 F.3d at 1322.
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delay in prosecution or market release.262 In the case of a terminally
disclaimed patent qualifying for a Hatch-Waxman extension-unlike a
patent qualifying for an adjustment for USPTO delay-the improvements
or modifications to the reference patent covered in the disclaimed patent
have necessarily resulted in a potentially marketable product that has
undergone regulatory review.2 6 3 This is the case either because the
reference patent covered an earlier, unmarketable version of the product, or
because the terminally disclaimed patent covers a new product that
requires a separate regulatory review period.2 6 In either case, the fact that
the invention in the terminally disclaimed patent undergoes regulatory
review signifies that the patent will add value to society beyond that
contributed by the invention covered in the reference patent, either because
an earlier invention has reached a marketable stage, or because a product
sufficiently different from an earlier invention to warrant a new regulatory
review has been created. The need to preserve incentives for developing
these socially valuable, albeit obvious, improvements is just as compelling
as it is for any other pioneer pharmaceutical product that is granted a
Hatch-Waxman extension. The social value justifies extending the patent
monopoly beyond the original expiration of the terminal disclaimer.
Conversely, the fact that a terminally disclaimed patent undergoes a delay
in prosecution does not necessarily offer any information about the value
of the terminally disclaimed patent as compared to the value of the
reference patent. Therefore, there is no good reason to expand the patent
monopoly of the original patent in this case.
4. Availability ofa Hatch- Waxman Extension for a Patent Adjusted
for USPTO Delay
a. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)
A patent may take advantage of both an adjustment for USPTO delay
and a Hatch-Waxman extension.2 65 The rule arises from language in the
Hatch-Waxman Act, which states that "[t]he term of a patent. . . shall be
extended in accordance with this section from the original expiration date
of the patent, which shall include any patent term adjustment granted
262 Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
263 This is the case because otherwise the patent would not qualify for a Hatch-Waxman




under section 154(b)."26 6 Although there is no case law directly addressing
this issue, the analysis in Hi-Tech suggests that the Federal Circuit would
uphold such an interpretation. 2 6 7 The court in Hi-Tech held that although
§ 156(a) does not explicitly mention the availability of a Hatch-Waxman
extension for a terminally disclaimed patent, it unambiguously directs the
USPTO to grant such an extension if the necessary conditions are met. 2 68
Thus, afortiori, § 156(a) should also require the USPTO to grant a Hatch-
Waxman extension to a patent that has received a term adjustment under
§ 154(b) because § 156(a) explicitly allows for such a possibility.
b. Policy Implications
This rule serves the goals of the patent system. A patentee who loses
some of its patent monopoly rights due to USPTO delay and then has its
patent rights further truncated by a regulatory review period should be
entitled to a remedy for each of these abridgments. Such an approach
preserves incentives for innovators while not unduly expanding the patent
monopoly. Further, the fact that the Hatch-Waxman extension calculation
is made from the time of patent issue and not from the time of patent filing
ensures that a patentee is not overcompensated by virtue of overlapping
regulatory review and prosecution delay.269
266 Id. (emphasis added).
267 See Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharm. Co., 482 F.3d 1317, 1320-23 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
2 6 8 Id. at 1322.
269 See Boone, supra note 89, at 659. To understand this point, consider the following
example. A patent is filed and the regulatory review process for the underlying invention is
initiated on the same date D. Without any extensions, the patent would expire twenty years
from filing, or on date D + 20. The patent takes three years to issue, two of which years are
determined to be due to prosecution delay. The patent issues on date D + 3, but its
expiration is extended for two years, such that it now expires on date D + 22. The
regulatory review process takes five years total, such that it is complete on date D + 5.
Instead of adding five years to the adjusted expiration date, the patent may only take
advantage of the period of regulatory review extending past the issue of the patent-two
years in this case. Thus, the patent will expire on date D + 24, an extension of four years in
total. This expiration accounts for the fact that there was overlap between the regulatory
review period and the prosecution delay period.
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5. Availability ofMore than One Hatch- Waxman Extension for a
Single Product
a. The USPTO's Interpretation of the Hatch- Waxman Act
A product with a single regulatory review period may be granted only
one Hatch-Waxman extension, even if there is more than one patent
covering this product.27 0 Further, if a product has undergone a previous
regulatory review, it may not claim a second extension for a later
regulatory review period.271  These rules arise from the language of the
Hatch-Waxman Act and usually preclude a single drug product from
taking advantage of more than one Hatch-Waxman extension, regardless of
the number of patents or regulatory review periods linked to that product.
A quirk in the statutory language opens a loophole, allowing a single
product to receive more than one extension when two separate regulatory
review periods for a product that is tied to two separate patents happen to
conclude on the same date.272 At least one drug has taken advantage of
this loophole with the approval of the USPTO and FDA. 2 73  The drug
Lyrica was undergoing two separate regulatory reviews for use in treating
neuropathic pain arising from two different disorders.274 The NDAs for
each of these uses were approved on the same date, and the patent owner
argued that each patent should qualify for a Hatch-Waxman extension
because there was no previous regulatory approval of the same drug to
prevent each drug from being classified as "new" under the statute. 27 5 The
USPTO and FDA agreed with this reasoning and granted an extension for
each of the patents.276
270 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(2).
271 Id. § 156(c)(4).
2 72 A drug must be classified as a "new drug" to qualify for a Hatch-Waxman extension.
Id. § 156(f)(2)(A). The statute further defines "new" as a drug that has not been previously
approved for marketing by the FDA. Id. § 156(a)(5)(A). Thus, unless both regulatory
review periods are terminated on the same date, the first review period to finish will
preempt the availability of a Hatch-Waxman extension for the second review period and
related patent because the drug for which the second extension is sought is no longer a
"new" drug.
273 Boone, supra note 89, at 662-63.
274 Id. at 662.
275 Id. at 662-63.




This statutory loophole was likely not contemplated by Congress.277
Further, it does not represent good policy. A goal of the Hatch-Waxman
Act is to provide sufficient incentives for pioneer pharmaceutical
manufacturers to research and develop new drugs.2 7 8 In this case, by
allowing a single drug to take advantage of more than one Hatch-Waxman
extension, the loophole in effect doubles the incentives with no concurrent
reciprocal benefit in innovation, causing deadweight loss to the system. It
could be argued that the incentives provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act are
necessary to encourage a pharmaceutical manufacturer to undertake the
regulatory review necessary before the drug can be put to a different and
beneficial use.2 7 9 This is a valid argument, but it ultimately fails for the
simple reason that it upsets the balance struck by Congress in enacting the
Hatch-Waxman Act. Congress decided that a single drug product could
not reap more than one Hatch-Waxman extension by denying such an
280
extension to a drug that had previously undergone regulatory review.
This choice seems reasonable given that a pharmaceutical manufacturer
having once undergone the expense of developing a new drug will likely
be willing to submit that drug for regulatory review for as many uses as
possible, even if an extension cannot be secured for more than one of the
regulatory review periods. A drug that is denied a second Hatch-Waxman
extension because the drug's two regulatory review periods end on
separate dates is not significantly different from a second drug that earns
two extensions because its two regulatory review periods end on the same
date." Allowing a small number of these drugs to reap a benefit based
solely on this difference would not represent a valid incentive, but instead
an arbitrary windfall to selected drug manufacturers. Therefore, if the
Federal Circuit has the opportunity to evaluate this practice, it should
overturn the USPTO's position and find that multiple Hatch-Waxman
extensions are not available in these circumstances.
277 d
278 See Lechner-Fish, supra note 70, at 388-89.
279 In the case of Lyrica, for example, a reasonable argument is that each Hatch-
Waxman extension was necessary to incentivize the separate clinical trials needed to gain
approval as a drug for treating both herpes-zoster-related neuropathic pain and diabetes-
related neuropathic pain.
280 See 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(4) (2006).
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D. Continuations
1. Availability of a URAA Adjustment for a Patent Based on a
Continuation Application
a. MPEP § 2701
A patent based on a continuation application filed after June 8, 1995,
may not benefit from a URAA term adjustment despite the fact that the
parent application was filed prior to this date.28 1 Such a patent will thus be
granted a term of twenty years from filing, calculated from the filing date
of the parent application.282 This rule arises from USPTO practice and
regulations. Section 2701 of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) states: "A patent granted on a continuation ... application that
was filed on or after June 8, 1995, will have a term which ends twenty
years from the filing date of earliest application . .. regardless of whether
the application . .. was filed prior to June 8, 1995."283
b. Policy Implications
This rule serves the goals of the patent system because it further
curtails the problem of submarine patenting that the transition to a twenty-
years-from-filing term helped to remedy. The practice of submarine
patenting is not socially beneficial because it disproportionately rewards
the patentee at the expense of future innovators and the public.284 A switch
to a term calculated from filing rather than from issue reduces the
usefulness of a submarine patent to patentees because patentees lose
monopoly protection for any term during which they deliberately delay
issuance.28 5 If a patent based on a continuation filed after the URAA
cutoff could profit from an alternative term calculation, the benefits of this
switch would be undermined. A patentee with a patent filed prior to the
cutoff could continue to file continuation applications based on this earlier
date indefinitely without sacrificing any patent term. The current practice
prevents such abuses. Therefore, if the Federal Circuit has the opportunity
to evaluate this practice, it should uphold the USPTO's position on this
matter.
281 See MPEP, supra note 29, § 2701.
282 d
283 id.
284 Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 79-80.
2 85 Id. at 80.
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2. Terminal Disclaimer ofa Patent Based on a Continuation
Application
A terminal disclaimer is equally available to a patent based on a
continuation application and a patent based on an original application.2 86
However, the URAA transition from an issuance-based term to a filing-
based term affected the significance of terminal disclaimers for
overcoming obviousness-type double patenting concerns in continuing
applications.28 7 Before the URAA was enacted, a terminal disclaimer
helped ensure that a patentee's monopoly was not improperly extended by
filing multiple continuation applications covering basically the same
invention as the parent patent. Because each patent based on a
continuation application lasted seventeen years from the date of issue, a
patentee could potentially extend the monopoly over the first invention
indefinitely by using this technique.288 Requiring a patentee to disclaim
the portion of a continuation patent that extended beyond the term of the
parent patent prevented the improper extension of the monopoly over the
parent invention.2 89 Under the URAA, patents based on continuation
applications expire twenty years from the parent application filing date,
and thus, the concern of improper extension is mitigated. In many cases,
no portion of the term may be disclaimed because the parent and child
already expire on the same date.290
Despite the seeming insignificance of the terminal disclaimer for a
patent based on a continuation application, the disclaimer must still be
filed in this situation or the patentee risks having both the parent and the
child patents invalidated.2 9 1 One might inquire whether this requirement
serves any useful purpose, or instead, whether it places an unnecessary
burden on patentees and provides a means of invalidating an otherwise
valid patent on the basis of a mere formality.
The answer to this question is that the terminal disclaimer continues to
play an important role in continuation applications for two reasons. First,
due to the potential availability of various extensions to the child patent,
the parent patent, or both the child and the parent may not automatically
286 35 U.S.C. § 253.
287 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 87 n.92.
288 Id. at 79-80.
2 8 9 See Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
290 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 87 n.92.
291 MPEP, supra note 29, § 804.02.
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expire on the same date.292 In such cases, the terminal disclaimer ensures
that the obvious continuation patent does not effectively extend the
monopoly over the parent patent.
Second, the terminal disclaimer serves another purpose beyond
preventing the inappropriate extension of the patent monopoly.293 Each
terminal disclaimer requires an affirmation that the disclaimed patent and
the patent to which it is disclaimed are commonly owned; the relevant
patents are invalidated if they cease to meet this requirement at any time.294
Absent this requirement of common ownership, a series of obvious patents
could be sold by the patentee to several different buyers, each of whom
could then independently enforce patent rights against a potential
infringer.2 9 5 This scenario would result in terrible uncertainty for those
wishing to use and improve upon the patented inventions and would chill
future innovation.9 Thus, even if the child and the parent application
expire on the same date, the terminal disclaimer serves an important role in
ensuring that obvious iterations of an invention remain commonly
owned.297 The rule requiring an obvious patent to be disclaimed even
when the application is based on a continuation application is thus a
necessary and beneficial rule that serves the goals of the patent system.
3. Availability of a Hatch- Waxman Extension for a Patent Based on a
Continuation Application
The Hatch-Waxman Act restricts the availability of Hatch-Waxman
extensions for related patents and products: 29 8 A patentee may not receive
more than one Hatch-Waxman extension for a single patent;299 a product
with a single regulatory review period may be granted only one Hatch-
Waxman extension; 00 and a product having previously undergone
regulatory review may not claim a second extension for a later regulatory
292 For example, under the Federal Circuit's decision in Hi-Tech, a terminally
disclaimed patent may take advantage of a Hatch-Waxman extension such that its
expiration uncouples from that of the reference patent. Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharm.
Co., 482 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
293 See In re Fallaux, 564 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
294 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (2012).
295 See Fallaux, 564 F.3d at 1319.
296 See id.
297 See id.
298 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(a)(2), (c)(4).
299 Id. § 156(a)(2).
30 Id. § 156(c)(4).
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review period.301 For a patent based on a continuation application, these
restrictions generally mean that only the earliest patent in a series of
related continuation applications may claim the benefit of a Hatch-
Waxman extension.
These statutory restrictions help to prevent both gaming by
pharmaceutical pioneers and the societal loss that arises from granting
unnecessary extensions to patents based on continuation applications.
However, for some time, pharmaceutical manufacturers were able to use
the unique interaction of rules governing continuations and terminal
disclaimers, along with other provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, to
delay generic drugs from entering the market and to extend inappropriately
their patent monopolies over patented drugs via a practice termed
"evergreening."302 Although evergreening was effectively terminated by
the 2003 amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act, it exemplifies how the
interaction of disparate elements of patent law can interact to create
unfortunate policy results.
a. Evergreening
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic manufacturer wishing to
enter the market must first certify to the FDA that its product will not
infringe any unexpired patents listed by pharmaceutical manufacturers in
the FDA's "Orange Book."3 0 3  If the patent owner believes that the
generic's product will infringe such a listed patent, the patentee may ask
the court for a thirty-month stay, during which the generic manufacturer
may not enter the market unless the infringement dispute is first resolved
in the generic manufacturer's favor.304 The continuation and terminal
disclaimer process allowed a pharmaceutical manufacturer to obtain
various patents at different times that all covered basically the same
invention, and to list each patent separately in the Orange Book. 3 05 Each
time a new patent was listed, the pharmaceutical manufacturer could apply
for a new thirty-month stay.306  Under the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act
301 Id. §§ 156(a)(5)(A), (f)(2)(A).
302 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 81-83.
303 OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, OFFICE OF PHARM. SCL, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION &
RESEARCH, FDA, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (33d ed. 2013), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCMO71436.pdf.
3 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
305 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 81-83.
306 id
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provisions, the number of such stays that could be obtained was unlimited;
the pharmaceutical manufacturer could therefore delay market entry of
generic manufacturers via frivolous stays until the original patent
expired.307
Congress effectively eliminated the practice of evergreening via its
2003 amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act.308 These amendments
provide that no more than one thirty-month stay can be granted for a single
product, even if it is linked to many different patents. 30 9 The practice of
evergreening is a reminder, however, of how the interaction of disparate
provisions of the patent code can leave room for practices that ultimately
undermine the policy goals of the patent system.
4. Availability ofa USPTO Delay Adjustment for a Patent Based on a
Continuation Application
The rules governing the availability of a USPTO delay-based term
adjustment for a patent filed as a continuation are complicated and depend
on the type of continuation application that is being filed. These rules arise
from USPTO practice and regulations and generally promote the goals of
the patent system by preventing unjustified extensions of the patent
monopoly.
a. USPTO Delay Adjustment for a Patent Based on a
Continuation, Continuation-in-Part, or Divisional Application
In general, a patent based on a continuation (excluding RCEs), a CIP,
or a divisional application may not take advantage of any USPTO delay
adjustments (including A-, B-, and C-type adjustments) accruing before the
continuation application was filed.310  This rule prevents unjustifiably
extending the patent monopoly. To understand why, consider each type of
application in turn. First, a continuation application is typically filed after
some claims have been allowed, and argues for broader claims in a second
patent.311 The rule thus prevents "double counting" delays in this case by
preventing the new patent from taking advantage of any delays already
accounted for in the expiration of the first patent. Similarly, a CIP
application may be filed after some claims have been allowed, but it also
adds new information to the application, something that is forbidden in a
307 id.
308 See Avery, supra note 58, at 184.
3 10 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.704(c)(1 1) (2012).
311 Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 64.
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traditional continuation application.3 12 The rule that prohibits counting
delays that accrue prior to filing the CIP prevents double counting, and
also prevents a patentee from taking advantage of delays that are not
necessarily related to the new and different information contained in the
CIP. Finally, a divisional application is filed when the USPTO determines
that a patent application contains more than one patentably distinct
invention.3 13 As with the CIP application, this rule prevents granting an
adjustment to the divisional patent based on delays unrelated to the
prosecution of the specific claims of that patent.
b. USPTO Delay Adjustment for a Patent Based on an RCE
An RCE application, unlike the other types of continuations, does not
extinguish previously accrued A-, B-, or C-type adjustments.3 14 Accrual of
B-type delay is precluded after an RCE is filed, stopping the three-year
pendency clock on filing the RCE.315 However, adjustments for A- and B-
type delays accruing after filing may still be granted.316 This differential
and more complicated treatment is justified by the purpose of the RCE
application. An RCE application is filed after a final rejection of a
previous application. Thus, unlike with continuation and CIP applications,
there is no previously allowed patent to take advantage of any accrued
delay adjustments, and allowing the RCE patent to take advantage of these
adjustments would not constitute an inappropriate double counting of
extensions. Further, just like continuation, CIP, and divisional
applications, there is no unjustified extension inherent in allowing the RCE
application to benefit from an adjustment for delays accruing due to
USPTO inaction subsequent to the RCE's filing. An RCE application,
however, may not take any further advantage of B-type delay (delay
accruing due to a longer-than-three-year pendency in the USPTO) once it
is filed. This final rule makes sense in light of the function of an RCE
application. An RCE application operates as an appeal of a USPTO
rejection. 3 17 Although there is a separate appeal process, the RCE carries
the advantage (in most cases) of retaining the same patent examiner and
receiving a second chance to persuade that examiner that the invention is
312 See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006); Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d
1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
3" 35 U.S.C. § 121.
314 See Tyson & Bahr, supra note 44.
315 See id.
316 See id.
317 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 96, at 64.
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patentable, rather than effectively restarting the prosecution process.318
Because the application was rejected, however, there is no USPTO "fault"
if the total pendency of the application is longer than three years. The
patentee should not be entitled to an adjustment for time-not attributable
to specific failures of the USPTO to act or in ancillary proceedings as in A-
and C-type delays-spent prosecuting claims that, in the form presented,
were ultimately deemed unpatentable.
E. Other Specific Extensions
Over the years, patent extensions have been granted, privately or
publicly, to individual products based on extreme delays in regulatory
approval. Between the years 1980 and 2002, seven such extensions were
granted; six of these extensions involved food and drug products for
human use, while the seventh was a drug product intended for veterinary
use.31 9 The goal of this Article is not to examine each one of these
extensions individually to determine whether each was justified in light of
the policy goals of the patent system. In general, however, this type of
extension should be avoided when possible. Although a private extension
may arguably maintain the proper incentives by correcting the occasional
patent term deviation-thereby ensuring that a patentee receives a reward
consistent with expectations-the practice also introduces uncertainty to an
already complex system of extensions and adjustments, and it may unfairly
favor larger producers with more lobbying power.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The current default patent term in the U.S. is measured as twenty years
from the date of patent filing. As can be seen from this Article, however,
the actual duration of an individual patent can vary extensively due to
diverse statutory opportunities for adjustment of the patent term.
Moreover, a single patent may be eligible for more than one such
adjustment, necessitating a determination of how these various statutes
interact. This determination has proved to be complex. In some cases,
Congress has clearly laid out the intended interaction among these statutes.
In other cases, a determination of how these provisions should interact has
been left to the USPTO, and when litigation has arisen, to the Federal
.1. See id.
319 WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21129,




Circuit, which has been criticized for inconsistent and ad hoc reasoning in
these cases.320
What results is a confluence of law that greatly affects the operation of
the patent system and also creates uncertain policy implications. This
Article systematically evaluates interactions among various statutory
schemes affecting patent term adjustments in light of the overarching goals
of the patent system-adequately incentivizing innovators and promoting
public access to inventions. A summary of this analysis is presented in
Table 1.
Table 1. Rules Governing the Interactions Among Various Patent Term
Adjustments
URAA
Possible term adjustment tor
patents issued before June 8,
1995
Congress No
Terminally URAA adjustment available, Yes, but distinction
disclaimed but based on language in USPTO based on language
patent disclaimer unnecessary
Adjustment for Available to all patents issued
USPTO delay after May 29, 2000 Congress Yes
(PTA)
URAA adjusted No PTA For a UIRAA adjusted Congress &
pa)'tent Patent usPTo Ye
No PTA for a terminally Congress &
T disclaimed patent Fed. Cir.
ially Exception: terminallydisclaimed
disclaimed patent may claimpatent USPTO Yesindependent adjustment up to
expiration of reference patent
IHIa tcllh-WVaXa n Extension available for food
exeso nd druig produicts subject to Congress Y'es
(HW) ~~regltatory delay ______
URAA adjusted Extension available for
patents unexpired on June 8, Fed. Cir. Yespatent 1995
320 See, e.g., Hinkens, supra note 8, at 377, 413.
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No, but right result is
Extension unavailable for reached because
patents in force solely because . these patents are





disclaied Ext ension available Fed. Cir. Yes
Patent
usedA adju a sted
patelt rExtensioni av ailable Congress Yes
patent
HWextnded GN1eayr nor eteso
pRen ors continuation patent alogress Yes
PTA.N(p~o2 adused Rlevrybsdoni typlbe opaten coninuato se USPTO Yes
TbrmiefeaiaioafTbelleelytai enrl hasrmn
or Temnaislimrmutb
of rues tht hav arise tr gorn tha neatoso tttr aettr
austm te fort t ouatio n patent systemg Ts espatent patents ied prior to June
misguided. Generally, not Hmeanxthat ensin o tea
tHa xteiFed General l n Ci t a l e otes eo c Congress Yespatent for a continuation patent
PTA ajuitsted Rles vary based oi type of USPTO Yes
patent contmentvFion
Other extensions aane must lose Congress Nobasis
A brief examination of Table 1 reveals that, in general, the assortment
of rules that have arisen to govern the interactions of statutory patent term
adjustments promotes the goals of the patent system. This does not mean
that some legislative enactments-particularly Congress's provision for a
term adjustment for patents issued prior to June 8, 1995-have not been
misguided. It also does not mean that criticisms of the ad hoc approach
that the Federal Circuit applied to these cases are meritless. The Federal
Circuit has employed varying policy rationales and has wavered about the
degree of deference owed to the USPTO in deciding cases dealing with
patent term adjustments. Moreover, the Federal Circuit's finding in
Kessler that a patentee must lose a previously earned Hatch-Waxman
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extension was incorrect, yet it reached the correct policy result because the
court failed to evaluate whether other unjustified extensions should be
eliminated.321 Similarly, the Federal Circuit's finding in Hi-Tech that a
terminally disclaimed patent is eligible for a Hatch-Waxman extension but
not an adjustment for USPTO delay is unjustified in light of the policy
considerations the court actually examined, but the decision is justified in
light of the broader goals of the patent system. 322 While these cases reach
the right result, this area of law warrants a more measured approach by the
court in the future.
There remain a few sets of circumstances that have yet to be litigated
before the Federal Circuit, which are currently governed by USPTO
regulations and practice. In some cases, the USPTO has done well to
formulate rules that promote the goals of the patent system: for example,
USPTO regulations governing the interaction of continuation-based
applications with various types of patent term adjustments. The Federal
Circuit should accord appropriate deference to the USPTO in cases where
such rules are contested. In other cases, such as with the USPTO's current
stance that more than one Hatch-Waxman extension is sometimes available
for a single drug, the Federal Circuit should closely examine the policy
implications of the USPTO's position. Such an approach will ensure that
the complicated scheme of patent term extensions continues to serve the
goals of the patent system.
321 See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
322 See Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharm. Co., 482 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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